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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellant, : BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
v. : 
DAVID R. WARDEN, : Case No. 
Defendant/Appellee. : Priority No. 14 
Brief of Appellant 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
1. Jurisdiction is conferred upon the Utah Supreme Court 
to hear this appeal by Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2 et sea. 1953, as 
amended. 
2. This appeal is from the decision of the Utah Court of 
Appeals, reversing the jury verdict of the Second Circuit Court of 
Davis County, Layton Department. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Is the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals in this 
matter in conflict with earlier decisions of the Court of Appeals, 
namely, State v. Tolman, 775 P.2d 422 (1989), holding that the 
existence of contrary evidence or of conflicting inferences does 
not warrant disturbing the jury's verdict? See also Steele v. 
Breinholt, 747 P.2d 433, 436 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
2. Is the ruling of the Utah Court of Appeals in this 
matter in conflict with rulings of the Utah Supreme Court, namely, 
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State v, Gardner, 101 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 10 (Utah 1989), holding 
that "... where there is any evidence, including reasonable 
inferences that can be drawn from it, from which findings of all 
elements of the crime can be made beyond a reasonable doubt, our 
inquiry is complete and we will sustain the verdict"? See also 
State v. McClaln; 706 P.2d 603, 607 (Utah 1985). 
3. Is there sufficient evidence to show a substantial and 
unjustifiable risk of death by viewing the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the jury verdict? 
OPINION BELOW 
The opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals in State v. 
Warden, 122 Utah Adv. Rep. 42 (Utah App. 1989), as published in the 
Utah Advance Reports appears as Appendix A to this petition. A 
copy of the Court of Appeals official opinion published as 784 P. 2d 
1204, appears as Appendix B to this brief. A copy of that court's 
order denying the State's petition for rehearing appears as 
Appendix C. 
PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES INVOLVED 
1. Utah Code Ann. §76-2-103(4) (1974) 
Definition of "criminal negligence or criminally 
negligent". 
A person engages in conduct: 
* * * 
(4) With criminal negligence or is 
criminally negligent with respect to circumstances 
surrounding his conduct or the result of his 
conduct when he ought to be aware of a substantial 
and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances 
exist or the result will occur. The risk must be 
of such a nature and degree that the failure to 
perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the 
standard of care that an ordinary person would 
2 
exercise in all the circumstances as viewed from 
the actor's standpoint. 
2. Utah Code Ann. §76-5-206 (1973) 
Negligent homicide. 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes negligent 
homicide if the actor, acting with criminal 
negligence, causes the death of another. 
(2) Negligent homicide is a class A misdemeanor. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, David R. Warden, was charged with Negligent 
Homicide, a class A misdemeanor, under Utah Code Ann. §76-5-206 
(1973). The defendant was initially tried by jury in the Second 
Circuit Court, Layton Department, beginning on November 16, 1987; 
however, the Court declared a mistrial on November 18, 1987 due to 
improper testimony given by one of the State's witnesses. A second 
jury trial was held beginning February 22, 1988, which continued 
through February 26, 1988. Defendant was convicted of the offense 
of Negligent Homicide as charged. 
The case was reviewed by the Court of Appeals and on 
November 22, 1989, the Court ruled by written opinion that the 
conviction should be reversed on the basis of insufficiency of the 
evidence, based upon the State's failure to establish a 
"substantial and unjustifiable risk of death." 
The State's petition for rehearing was denied without 
comment (Appendix B). 
The State petitioned this court for a Writ of Certiorari 
and that petition was granted. The case is now before this court 
upon writ of certiorari. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant was charged in the Fourth Circuit Court, Layton 
Department, with the negligent homicide of Jareth Youngf the infant 
son of Joanne Young, 
Joanne Young is a citizen of England and came to the United 
States in July of 1984, when she was fifteen years old (T.Vol.II, 
p.39). During the month of March 1986, she became pregnant at the 
age of seventeen years (T.Vol.Ill, p.40). 
In July 1986, Joanne went to Dr. Mark Bitner, a board 
certified obstetrician/gynecologist, who confirmed that she was 
indeed pregnant. Dr. Bitner established the projected date of 
confinement at about December 21, 1986 (T.Vol.II, p.175). Joanne's 
recollection was that the due date was December 19th (T.Vol. Ill, 
p.43). 
Joanne learned that the defendant did home deliveries and 
decided she wanted a home delivery because she was too embarrassed 
at being pregnant out-of-wedlock and did not want to go to a 
hospital and have people know (T.Vol.TII, p.48). 
Joanne first went to Dr. Warden on September 8th 
(T.Vol.Ill, p.50). He established her due date as being December 
17th (T.Vol.Ill, p.53). Joanne was not given any instruction by 
Dr. Warden as to what to do should anything unusual occur nor was 
she given instruction as to the care of the baby (T.Vol.Ill, p.57). 
At approximately 8 o'clock on the morning of November 7th, 
Joanne discovered she was having cramps and was bleeding an amount 
of blood consistent with a heavy day of a normal menstrual period 
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(T.Vol.Ill, pp.60-63). Joanne's mother, Ivy Young, made a phone 
call to Dr. Warden, who was at the University of Utah attending a 
football game. Dr. Warden told her not to worry, that Joanne was 
in labor (T.Vol.I, p.61). He instructed her to call back at 1:00 
p.m. (T.Vol.I, p.62). 
Ivy called again at 1:00 p.m. (T.Vol.I, p.64) and was told 
not to bring Joanne to the clinic (T.Vol.I, p.65). Ivy phoned 
again at 4:00 p.m. to inform the defendant that Joanne was losing 
blood clots, at which time he told her to "stop fussing" (T.Vol.I, 
p.66). Ivy called again at about 10:15 p.m. to tell the defendant 
that Joanne was in the last stages of labor (T.Vol.I, p.67). 
The defendant arrived at the Young home at approximately 
10:30 p.m. (T.Vol.I, p.68) and the baby, Jareth Young, was born 
within a matter of minutes (T.Vol.Ill, p.74; also T.Vol.I, p.76). 
Ivy then weighed the infant on the bathroom scales and reported to 
Dr. Warden that the weight of the baby was about four pounds 
(T.Vol.I, p.73). 
Soon after the birth, Ivy noted that the infant made 
unusual sounds, "like a pig grunting" (T.Vol.I, p.78). She also 
noticed that the hands and torso of the baby were purplish-blue 
(T.Vol.I, p.79). Ivy repeatedly requested that Defendant check 
Jareth (T.Vol.I, pp.73,82,83,84). Defendant diagnosed the baby as 
suffering from respiratory distress syndrome (T.Vol.Ill, p.98) and 
decided not to hospitalize the baby (T.Vol.IV, pp.175-177). 
Defendant remained at the Young home for about an hour. 
The only instructions he gave to Ivy Young was to watch the baby 
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through the night (T.Vol.1, p.86) and if she needed help to call 
(T.Vol.II, p.115). He did not tell her that the baby could die of 
the respiratory condition (T.Vol.IV, p.184). 
In the morning when Jareth's condition had deteriorated, 
Ivy Young attempted to contact the defendant at his office 
(T.Vol.I, p.95), at his home (T.Vol.I, p.96), and again at his 
office (T.Vol.I, p.98) with no success. 
Finally, she contacted her bishop in the LDS church 
(T.Vol.I, p.98), who responded with a pediatrician, Dr. Kramer 
(T.Vol.I, p.101). The infant was transferred to the hospital but 
died soon thereafter (T.Vol.I, p.104). 
The State Medical Examiner, Dr. Edwin S. Sweeney, testified 
that Jareth Young died of Respiratory Distress Syndrome, due to 
prematurity (T.Vol.Ill, p.13). He opined that the weight of the 
child . was about four pounds (T.Vol.Ill, p.15), and that the 
gestational age of the baby was 33-34 weeks (T.Vol.Ill, p.34). 
According to Dr. Kramer (T.Vol.II, p.247) and Dr. Branch 
(T.Vol.Ill, p.162), there is no recognized specialty in home 
delivery in the State of Utah. 
Dr. Frank Kramer, a board certified pediatrician who came 
to the home at the request of the LDS bishop and attended the 
infant until his death at Humana Davis North Hospital, testified 
that based upon the physical size of the baby, one could tell it 
was not a well child (T.Vol.II, p.276). Dr. Kramer testified that 
the baby should have been hospitalized immediately following birth 
(T.Vol.II, p.277), and that Jareth Young was obviously premature 
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(T.Vol.11/ p.280). Finally, Dr. Kramer testified that the local 
hospital, Humana Davis North, has a policy that a mother should be 
sent to a center with an intensive care unit if the mother is felt 
to be less than 35 weeks of gestation (T.Vol.II p.281). 
Dr. Ware Branch, an obstetrician/gynecologist for the 
University of Utah, testified that he teaches obstetrics at the 
University of Utah College of Medicine, teaching general principles 
of obstetrics to medical students and residents and understands the 
standard of care of both general practitioners and other 
specialists in the area of obstetrics (T.Vol.Ill, pp.162-163). The 
general principles in that regard do not vary from a doctor 
practicing in a hospital setting as opposed to a home setting 
(T.Vol.Ill, p.164). 
When given hypothetical facts equivalent to the situation 
of this case up to 8s00 a.m. on November 7, 1986, Dr. Branch 
indicated that the standard of care would be to see the patient for 
evaluation for the use of Tocolysis, or stopping labor (T.Vol.Ill, 
p.179). 
On cross-examination, defense counsel asked Dr. Branch 
about the standard of care regarding leaving a baby in Jareth's 
condition with the family at home, and Branch replied, "... in my 
opinion, this baby has to be observed in the hospital setting..." 
(T.Vol.Ill, p.225). 
Finally, Dr. Branch in evaluating the course of action 
taken by Dr. Warden, stated, "... what would I tell a resident in 
training? He better not ever, ever do that again or I'll see to it 
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that he's on the street." He then elaborated, "Well, I mean, I 
have, in discussion with you here today, disagreed with the 
prospective management of the events of the 7th of November, and I 
would disagree with them again." (T.Vol.Ill, p.225) 
Further, he stated, "I think that the judgment decision to 
leave a small, quite likely premature baby in the hands of someone 
who doesn't really have any medical experience, I think that 
judgment is far too liberal for these times and I wouldn't do 
that." (T.Vol.Ill, p.227) 
Dr. Gary Chan, a neonatologist for the University of Utah, 
testified that he has taught interns and residents in training, in 
pediatrics, family practice, anesthesiology, and obstetrics, and is 
familiar with the standards of practice in all of those areas 
(T.Vol.Ill, p.235), and further, that the standard would not vary 
from a hospital to a home-birth setting (T.Vol.Ill, p.276). He 
stated the standard of care for a baby of four pounds and 33-34 
weeks gestation age "... would certainly be admitted to a newborn 
intensive care i^ nit." (T.Vol.Ill, p.239) 
Given a hypothetical circumstance consistent with that of 
the birth of Jareth Young, Dr. Chan stated that if Jareth were 
immediately in his care in the hospital intensive care unit, the 
probability of survival would have been 99 per cent (T.Vol.Ill, 
p.248) . 
Dr. Chan also stated that any physician should be able to 
recognize if the baby was in respiratory distress (T.Vol.Ill, 
p.249) and failure to treat the baby would result in increased risk 
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of mortality to five, ten, or fifteen per cent (T.Vol.Ill, p.250). 
When asked if it would be within the standard of care in 
this area for physicians to leave that baby in a home setting with 
a layperson monitoring the progress of that baby immediately after 
birth, Dr. Chan's response was, "Absolutely not." (T.Vol.Ill, 
pp.256, 273). He later stated the risk of death to a baby left in 
the care of a layperson would increase 10 to 20 times. 
Dr. Chan stated the grunting sound was symptomatic of 
respiratory distress (T.Vol.Ill, p.276). It is possible to adjust 
the position of the baby to eliminate the sound, but it does not 
affect the exertion of the baby or the progress of the disease 
(T.Vol.Ill, p.277). This testimony was in direct contradiction to 
Dr. Warden's. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellant advances three arguments in support of it's 
position that the Court of Appeals decision be reversed. 
(1) The ruling of this panel of the Utah Court of Appeals 
is in conflict with rulings of other panels of the Court of Appeals 
in that it weighed evidence favorable to the defendant which was 
controverted by other competent evidence. 
(2) The ruling of the Utah Court of Appeals is in conflict 
with rulings of the Utah Supreme Court in that the court looked 
beyond the evidence most favorable to the jury verdict. 
(3) There is sufficient evidence to show a substantial and 
unjustifiable risk of death by viewing the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the verdict. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE RULING OF THIS PANEL OF THE UTAH COURT OF 
APPEALS IS IN CONFLICT WITH RULINGS OF OTHER 
PANELS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IN THAT IT WEIGHED 
EVIDENCE FAVORABLE TO THE DEFENDANT WHICH WAS 
CONTROVERTED BY OTHER COMPETENT EVIDENCE. 
The Utah Court of Appeals opinion properly cites State v. 
Tolman, 775 P.2d 422 (Utah 1989) as a standard of review, but fails 
to recognize the rule regarding conflicting evidence: 
Although contrary evidence was presented, 
"[t]he existence of contradictory evidence or 
conflicting inferences does not warrant disturbing 
the jury's verdict." Tolman at 424, 425. 
That rule has been consistently recognized by other panels 
of the Court of Appeals. See Steele v. Breinholt, supra, at 436; 
State v. Arroyo, 770 P.2d 153 (Utah Ct App 1989). 
The Court of Appeals opinion, in reversing on the issue of 
sufficiency of the evidence, summarized the evidence in five 
paragraphs. Nearly all of the evidence relied upon by the court 
was contradicted in the evidence presented. Those five paragraphs 
are reproduced below along with 
testimony: 
COURT OF APPEALS OPINION 
Defendant testified at trial 
that the grandparents weighed 
the newborn baby and determined 
it to be about five pounds. 
Defendant also said he 
believed the baby to be two to 
three weeks premature. 
examples of the contradictory 
EXCERPTS FROM TRIAL TRANSCRIPT 
Dr. Sweeney, State Medical 
Examiner: 
A: 1.86 kilograms, 2.2 pounds 
per kilogram off the top of my 
head that would be about four 
pounds, but I don't have a 
calculator. 
The Court: I gen 4.092 working 
it out here at the bench. 
The witness: So it would be 
about four pounds one ounce, 
10 
Defendant was aware that the 
baby was having "grunting 
respirations,•• which he said 
was a sign of early respiratory 
distress syndrome. 
Defendant positioned the baby 
in such a way that the labored 
breathing was relieved. 
approximately. 
T.Vol.Ill, p.15 
Dr Sweeney, State Medical 
Examiner: 
Q: Did you come to a con-
clusion as to how long it had 
been in the uterus prior to 
birth? 
A: I did. 
Q: What was that conclusion? 
A: That it was consistent with 
approximately 33 to 34 weeks 
with 40 normally being the 
number that is used for full 
term. 
T.Vol.Ill, p.7 
Dr. Kramer, State's 
Pediatrician: 
Q: When you did that 
measurement, what conclusion 
did you come to? 
A: Based on weight, height and 
head circumference, the baby 
was 33 or 34 weeks of 
gestation, which means the baby 
was probably six to seven weeks 
early. 
T.Vol.II, p.269 
Dr. Chan, University of Utah: 
Q: Is it possible to adjust 
the position of the baby so as 
to elimin^le the grunting 
sound? 
A: Yes. And that's irrelevant 
to me because the baby could be 
face down and the noised could 
be muffled. There's many ways 
that we can change the noise 
coming out. That' s not 
relevant to me. 
Q: Does the changing of the 
noise change the exertion of 
the brK7? 
A: No. 
Q: Does it change the progress 
of the disease? 
A: No. 
Q: Does it have any 
physiologic effect whatsoever 
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with regard to the disease? 
A: No. 
T.Vol.Ill, p.277 
He further testified that the 
severity of the respiratory 
distress did not indicate a 
need for hospitalization. 
He said that he informed Ivy 
that the baby was premature and 
had difficulty breathing, but 
that the baby was then stable. 
Dr. Kramer: 
Q: Now, 'in this particular 
case, I think you recognized 
that the baby was born at the 
home of the Youngs and then 
after the birth of the baby was 
left at the home of the Youngs 
for a time? 
A: That's what I was told. 
Q: And I understand that you 
feel that that is inappropriate 
because the baby should have 
been placed in the hospital? 
That's your conclusion? 
A: That's my opinion. 
T.Vol.II, pp.289-290 
He instructed Ivy to call him 
if there was any change and 
admitted that he was depending 
on Ivy to carefully watch the 
infant. 
Ivy Young: 
A: He told me to watch the 
baby through the night. 
Q: He said watch the baby 
through the night? 
A: (witness nods) 
Q: Anything else? 
A: No. He didn't tell me what 
to watch for. He just said to 
watch the baby. 
Q: Did he say anything to you 
if any problem arose or 
anything of this sort? 
A: No. 
Q: Didn't say, "Call me if 
there's a problem."? 
A: No. 
T.Vol.I, pp.85-86 
Before leaving the Young 
residence, defendant noted the 
respiratory difficult had 
subsided. 
He stated, "The baby was 
respiring well, the baby was 
still awake and alert and 
muscle tone was still good." 
He also said, "I was 
Dr. Chan: 
A: * A baby who is born at 33, 
34 weeks gestation at 
approximately four pounds, 
which I think is less than two 
kilos, 2,000 grams — 
Q: Yes. 
A: — would certainly be 
admitted to a newborn intensive 
12 
impressed that the baby had 
already shown some signs of 
respiratory distress syndrome, 
but under similar circumstances 
in the past, I have left babies 
at home, having instructed the 
mother on how to nurse, having 
instructed the mother to keep 
the baby warm and therefore I 
felt I could leave, confident 
that grandma would call me, 
confident that if there were 
any progression of symptoms 
that I would be called. 
Defendant later testified 
that of 300 home births he had 
attended, approximately ten of 
those babies had been 
premature. 
Eight of those had no 
respiratory distress, but 
defendant said that he had 
hospitalized only three of 
those eight. 
In the case of this infant, 
defendant testified that "in my 
experience and the judgment 
that I applied at the time 
based on experience with babies 
who are even smaller that this 
delivered at home, they can in 
many cases get along very, very 
well ..." 
care unit. That baby is at 
high risk for, one, developing 
respiratory problems, such as 
hyaline membrane disease; 
second, metabolic problems like 
low sugar; electrolyte problems 
and also anemia or infection. 
T.Vol.Ill, pp.239-240 
Ivy Young: 
Q: All right. Now, at that 
time (just as the Dr. left) did 
you note the breathing? 
A: It still stayed the same. 
It was the same noise then the 
baby would quit the noise and 
kind of rest for awhile. 
Q: So what you heard was a 
grunting sound and then it 
seemed like it would rest for 
awhile? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Could you detect in those 
rest periods whether or not the 
baby was breathing? 
A: He seemed to be. It was 
just kind of a very short 
period. Each time I checked 
that he was okay and I turned 
him to the other side and then 
he'd start grunting again. 
Q: How often would he make 
this grunting sound? 
A: He was just making the 
grunting sound all the ^ xme. 
T.Vol.I, p.88 
Dr. K r a m e r , State's 
Pediatrician: 
A: I'm not sure whether Dr. 
Warden had the confidence of 
the parents to watch this baby. 
I'm not sure what happened, but 
I believe, if I can explain 
this, I believe that parents or 
grandparents are ~ot in the 
position to evaluate a baby's 
situation where the baby is, in 
my opinion, premature. 
T.Vol.II, p.293 
The State's expert medical 
witness testified that although 
the mother and baby "would do 
better" in a hospital, 
defendant's evaluation of the 
infant's well being would 
indicate that the baby's vital 
signs were "acceptable". 
Dr. Chan: 
Q: Would the high Apgar score 
to you indicate that it is not 
a high risk baby? 
A: No. 
Q: Would that baby still be, 
in your opinion, a high risk 
baby? 
A: Yes. 
T.Vol.Ill, p.255 
Dr. Kramer: 
Q: My previous question was 
couched in terms of otherwise 
healthy. Changing that 
hypothetical just somewhat to 
say that the child had those 
same physical dimensions but 
had an acceptable eight, nine, 
or ten Apgar score, would that 
child be considered a healthy 
child? 
A: No. 
T.Vol.II, p.278,279 
They conceded that the infant 
may have survived had he been 
hospitalized up to ten hours 
after birth, but believed that 
leaving the baby at home was 
"bad judgment" on defendant's 
part. 
The State's neonatologist 
testified that hyaline membrane 
disease is a progressive 
disease. 
He also indicated that a baby 
in the condition of the 
deceased is typically "at high 
risk for medical and surgical 
problems." 
As far as mortality for an 
infant with the disease, 
however, he stated that the 
failure to provide therapy 
would only place the 
probability of death at five to 
fifteen percent. 
He later stated upon cross 
examination that statistically 
only two percent of babies die 
Dr. Kramer: 
Q: Can you comment on the 
probability of saving the child 
at 8 o'clock? 
A: I don't know, the earlier 
the better. 
T.Vol.II, pp.307-308 
Dr. Chan: 
Q: . With that scenario where 
the baby was about four pounds, 
33 to 34 weeks in gestation, 
about ten hours old, blue and 
with a lowered heart rate and 
respiration, frould you expect 
to be able to save the baby? 
A: I would hope so, but I 
would have my doubts. 
T.Vol.Ill, p.247 
Dr. Chan: 
Q: How much would the 
probability of life for that 
child be decreased by the 
failure to provide therapy? 
A: Failure to provide therapy 
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from untreated hyaline membrane 
disease. 
He further said, "I guess the 
message is it's very unusual 
and rare to lose a baby at this 
gestation and this birth weight 
from hyaline membrane disease." 
Asked whether it would be 
outside the medical standard of 
care to have the family of a 
home-delivered newborn to 
monitor any changes in the 
baby's condition, the 
neonatologist believed it was, 
but conceded that other 
competent physicians would 
disagree with him. 
for a baby at 33, 34 weeks 
gestation who has developed 
hyaline membrane disease, I 
think you extent of mortality, 
instead of less than one 
percent, you move into five, 
ten, fifteen percent. 
T.Vol.Ill, p.250 
The State's expert testified 
that the medical community in 
this state does not teach or 
train physicians for home 
delivery and generally 
recommends against it. 
Dr. Chan: 
A: That's to me a naive 
approach to the problem because 
it does occur and I think home 
deliveries are appropriate in 
many circumstances. 
T.Vol.Ill, p.266 
The court misapprehended the statement of the witness 
regarding the "statistic" that only two percent of babies die of 
untreated hyaline membrane disease. 
Qs Untreated could be in the hospital or it 
could be —> it doesn't matter where it is, I 
suggest. The bottom line is that the child is 
untreated; therefore, if you have hyaline 
membrane, 33 to 34 weeks and it's untreated, 2 
percent, two out of a hundred may die? 
A: We're not talking apples and oranges. If 
the baby is in the hospital and it's — see, 
there's no study where you say this baby will be 
treated and this baby will not be treated. I'm 
giving you the statistics of all babies in the 
hospital being watched and there's some babies you 
watch carefully and they don't need any treatment, 
don't require any treatment, and those babies — 
and if you say yes, if you're looking at those 
babies that are not treated, very few of them will 
die* (T.Vol.Ill, p.260) 
15 
It would be both unethical and inhumane to do a study in 
a hospital in which patients exhibiting symptoms requiring therapy 
are divided into two groups: one which will be treated and one 
which will not. The statistics quoted by the witness were for 
patients who were not treated for the reason that in the opinion of 
their physicians, therapy was not required. Under those 
circumstances, very few will die. 
Further, on re-direct, the witness clarified his position: 
Q: Now, we've had some talk about percentages and 
it's a little bit confusing, so I just want to 
recap a bit. From the point of view of the 
doctor, leaving the home 30 minutes after the 
birth of the baby, given the factors that the baby 
is 33 to 34 weeks in gestation, that it's four 
pounds, that it's got some blueness in it's 
extremities and that it's making the grunting 
sounds, what can you say about that baby? 
A. That baby had respiratory distress syndrome. 
That baby is having respiratory problems. That 
baby is sick. 
Q: All right. Now, do you say anything with 
regard to the probability of it's dying from that 
disease if it's untreated or left in the care of 
a layperson? 
A: I think to leave a baby with hyaline membrane 
disease with a layperson just creates increased 
problems of mortality for that baby, morbidity. 
Q: Can you give us any kind of a quantitative 
objective basis that we can develop as to what the 
degree of risk there is for that baby left in the 
care of a layperson? 
A: It is very high. You could say 10, 20, - 20 
times higher when left to a layperson to manage 
the baby. 
T.Vol.Ill, pp.278-279 
In any event, the determination of criminal negligence 
should not be established by percentages of morbidity. It is to be 
determined by a subjective standard rather than an objective 
standard. State v. Ruben, 663 P.2d 445 (Utah 1983). 
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POINT II. 
THE RULING OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS IS IN 
CONFLICT WITH RULINGS OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT IN 
THAT THE COURT LOOKED BEYOND THE EVIDENCE MOST 
FAVORABLE TO THE JURY VERDICT. 
Again, reviewing the opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals, 
the court cites evidence favorable to the defendant. The Utah 
Supreme Court has consistently ruled that the standard for review 
of a jury verdict is to look at the evidence favorable to the jury 
verdict to test it's sufficiency. 
In reviewing the conviction, we do not substitute 
our judgment for that of the jury. "It is the 
exclusive function of the jury to weigh the 
evidence and to determine the credibility of the 
witnesses..." State v. Lamm, 606 P.2d 229, 231 
(Utah 1980); accord State v. Linden, 657 P.2d 
1364, 1366 (Utah 1983). 
So long as there is some evidence, including 
reasonable inferences from which findings of all 
the requisite elements of the crime can reasonably 
be made, our inquiry stops. State v. Booker, 709 
P. 2d 342 at 345 (Utah 1985). See also State v. 
Gardner, 101 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 10 (Utah 1989), 
State v. McClain, 706 P.2d 603, 607 (Utah 1985). 
The original Utah Court of Appeals' opinion published in 
the Utah Advance Reports indicated that it failed to adhere to that 
standard in the instant case: 
Thus, reasonable minds could examine the evidence 
presented and entertain a vreasonable doubt that 
the defendant committed the crime of which he was 
convicted'. Warden, 122 Utah Adv. Rep. 42, at 45. 
(emphasis added) 
That statement is clearly not the standard established by 
the cases cited. Under the established standard, the court should 
only overturn the conviction if "...reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the 
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crime of which he was convicted." State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 
444 (Utah 1983). 
The Court of Appeals apparently amended its opinion prior 
to publication in the official report, correctly stating the 
standard: 
Thus, in examining the evidence presented, 
responsible minds must have entertained a 
Reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the 
crime of which he was convicted.' Warden, 784 P. 2d 
1204, at 1209 
(emphasis added) 
The court further misapplied the standard of review in it's 
assessment of the evidence. In its original opinion, the Court of 
Appeals wrote: 
This response merely reinforces our conclusion 
that his testimony, as well as that of the other 
experts for the State, must be construed in light 
of the fact that home delivery, though legal, is 
not a widespread practice by doctors in Utah. 
Warden, 122 Utah Adv.Rep. 42, at 45. 
(emphasis added) 
That sentence was omitted in the official report (Warden, 
784 P.2d, at 1209). The omission of the court's rationale does not 
change the fact that there was expert testimony that the actions of 
the defendant were outside the standard of care. The jury must be 
at liberty to decide the issue of criminal negligence. 
In coming to the conclusion that a jury must have a 
reasonable doubt, the Court of Appeals has mandated that the 
State's expert testimony be given less weight than th° testimony of 
the defendant's witnesses. 
The jury was aware that home delivery is not taught as a 
practice in the Utah medical community, but that the standard of 
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care and treatment would be the same in the home as if in a 
hospital setting. Although some of the experts admitted they 
discouraged homebirth as a practice, Dr. Chan clarified that to 
discourage homebirth is a naive approach and that you must 
recognize that homebirths do occur and are appropriate in many 
circumstances (T.Vol.Ill, p.266). 
By concluding that the medical experts testimony must be 
viewed critically, the court has removed from the jury the function 
of assessing the weight of the evidence. 
To establish criminal negligence, it is necessary 
to show conduct which is %a gross deviation from 
the standard of care that an ordinary person would 
exercise in all the circumstances as viewed from 
the actor's standpoint.' ...It is therefore a 
subjective element requiring consideration of all 
relevant circumstances surrounding the incident. 
State v. Ruben, supra. 
The Utah Supreme Court recognized in State v. Bolsinqer, 
699 Po2d 1214 (Utah 1985), that a jury could take into account 
several factor in evaluating conduct: 
In Neitzel, supra, the court enumerated four 
determining factors a jury should be asked when it 
evaluates conduct resulting in death and alleged 
to be depraved indifferences (1) the utility of 
the defendant's conduct, (2) the magnitude of the 
risk, (3) the defendant's knowledge of the risk, 
(4) any precautions taken by the defendant to 
minimize the risk. Bolsinqer at 1220, referring 
to Neitzel v. State, 655 P. 2d 325 (Alaska App. 
1982) 
The jury was entitled to assess each of the above factors 
in relation to this case to determine whether the defendant was 
criminally negligent. The court should not reverse the jury's 
conclusions unless it finds there is no evidence to support those 
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conclusions. 
1. THE UTILITY OF DEFENDANT'S CONDUCT. It is undisputed 
that the family requested a home delivery and that there is some 
social utility to the practice of home birth. The question is what 
social utility was there in leaving Jareth Young in his diseased 
condition to the care of Ivy Young, an inexperienced layperson. 
The jury was entitled to accept the testimony of Ivy Young that the 
defendant left her with no instructions as to what to watch for and 
that Ivy Young asked the defendant if the victim ought not be 
hospitalized. The jury is further entitled to question the utility 
of the defendant's failure to diligently attend his patients before 
and after delivery. 
The jury should further be able to assess the social 
utility of practicing home birth medicine while not maintaining 
malpractice insurance and not being authorized to admit patients 
into a hospital or treat patients in a hospital setting. 
2. MAGNITUDE OF THE RISK. The magnitude of the risk can 
best be assessed by determining the amount th^c the risk of death 
is increased by defendant's decision to leave the victim in the 
care of the grandmother, Ivy Young. Dr. Chan testified that so 
doing increased the probability of death ten to twenty times. 
'The single most important factor in determining the nature 
and magnitude of the risk is the fact that Hyaline Membrane Disease 
is a progressive disease. That is, given all infants of this 
gestational age who contract the disease, five to fifteen percent 
can be expected to die without medical intervention. The 
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probability of death increases as the disease progresses. The 
experts agreed that as medical intervention became necessary, time 
became an increasingly important factor. 
3. THE DEFENDANT'S KNOWLEDGE OF THE RISK. Defendant 
acknowledged on the witness stand that he had diagnosed the 
disease, that he was aware that it was progressive in nature and 
that it was potentially fatal (T.Vol.IV, p.176). He had even made 
the determination that the baby would be better off in the hospital 
(T.Vol.IV, p.174). Sharon Johnson asked the defendant if the child 
shouldn't be hospitalized but he told her it would not be necessary 
(T.Vol.IV, p.126). 
4. PRECAUTIONS TAKEN BY THE DEFENDANT TO MINIMIZE THE 
RISK. Emphasis has been placed by both the State and the defendant 
upon the decision to leave the victim in the care of the 
grandmother, a layperson. That act alone, however, is not the only 
act for which the defendant should be held accountable. 
Consideration should be given to the immediate prenatal care or 
lack thereof, and the total absence of a reasonable course of 
follow-up care after the birth. The jury instruction given by the 
trial court stated: 
The standard of care to be applied in this 
case is that which is applicable to a physician 
practicing general medicine in connection with the 
pregnancy, labor, delivery, and aftercare of a 
mother and newborn infant in the circumstances of 
this case. (R. at page 53) 
The defendant failed to minimize the risks that existed 
early in the day prior to delivery. He failed to minimize the 
risks at the time of delivery and then after diagnosing the disease 
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he failed to minimize the risks as the disease progressed. 
Instead, the defendant made the conscious decision not to minimize 
the risk of death by turning care of the infant over to specialists 
in a hospital setting. Had he done so, the probability of death 
was less than 1%. 
POINT III. 
THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SHOW A SUBSTANTIAL 
AND UNJUSTIFIABLE RISK OF DEATH BY VIEWING THE 
EVIDENCE IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO THE 
VERDICT. 
[A] Marshalling the evidence favorable to the verdict 
reveals that there was sufficient evidence to support the verdict. 
The standard of review that should have been applied by the 
Utah Court of Appeals is enunciated in State v. BMG Corporation, 
700 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1985): 
To mount a successful attack on the trial 
court's findings of fact, an appellant must 
marshall all the evidence in support of the trial 
court's findings and then demonstrate that even 
viewing it in the light most favorable to the 
court below, the evidence is insufficient to 
support the findings. BMG Corporation, at 1070. 
Marshalling the evidence in this case in the light most 
favorable to the jury verdict, the following inferences can be 
drawn: 
1. Defendant was a licensed physician who had maintained 
a family practice since 1968, including obstetrical care (T.Vol.IV, 
pp.39-48); 
2. Defendant assumed responsibility for the infant's 
physical well-being by agreeing to deliver it at home; 
3. Defendant did not insists on examining the mother when 
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she reported vaginal bleeding to determine if premature birth was 
likely; 
4. Defendant knew that the established due date was 
several weeks off, yet he failed to personally attend the patient, 
a fact the defendant admitted on the witness stand was an error in 
judgment (T.Vol.IV. pp.153, 163); 
5. Defendant knew that the local practice was not to have 
babies delivered at the local hospital if the gestation period is 
less than 35 weeks, but rather to deliver in a more specialized 
hospital (T.Vol.II, p.281); 
6. Defendant could have minimized the risk of premature 
birth by Tocolysis (T.Vol.Ill, p.179); 
7. The practice of referring a mother in premature labor 
to a hospital for Tocolysis is within the standard of care for 
physicians practicing home births and for this doctor personally 
(T.Vol.IV, p.131); 
8. Defendant could have slowed the onset of labor by 
methods available in a homebirth setting (T.Vol.IV, p.131); 
9. Defendant could then have had the baby delivered in a 
hospital setting, as would have been his own normal practice even 
under these conditions, since he would not normally deliver a 
premature baby in a home (T.Vol.IV, p.149); 
10. Defendant diagnosed the infant after birth as having 
Respiratory Distress Syndrome and had actual knowledge of the risk 
of death posed by the disease, that it was progressive in nature, 
the techniques available for monitoring the progress of the disease 
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by electronic equipment, and the treatments available in Class III 
hospital neonatal units (T.Vol.IV, pp.175-178); 
11. Defendant could have immediately hospitalized the 
baby, but did not; 
12. Defendant could have remained longer in the home 
himself, but did not; 
13. Defendant could have arranged for a nurse or other 
trained professional to monitor the progress of the disease, but 
did not; 
14. Defendant could have provided Ivy Young with a 
specific list of symptoms with an objective standard for 
observation, but did not; 
15. Defendant could have provided Ivy Young with a 
protocol for action more thorough than to just call him; 
16. Defendant advised the family to position the baby in 
a way which relieved the symptoms but would not alleviate the 
condition itself, but would rather mask the indicators of the 
progress of the disease; 
17. Defendant minimized the seriousness of the infant's 
condition to both Sharon and Ivy, and never advised anyone that the 
child could die from the disease (T.Vol.IV, p.132); 
18. The practice of hospitalizing an infant with the 
disease was within the standards of the defendant's practice and, 
indeed, he had hospitalized three of eight children he had 
delivered at home with the disease (T.Vol.IV. p.132); 
19. The defendant was not authorized to hospitalize this 
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infant because he had no malpractice insurance, so would have to 
call another physician or have the infant admitted through an 
emergency room facility, which would cause him some embarrassment 
(T.Vol.IV, pp.121-122,124,126,127) 
20. Defendant left the infant in the care of a layperson, 
the grandmother, with instructions only to watch the infant through 
the night, without any specific instructions as to what to watch 
for (T.Vol.I, p.86); 
21. Defendant consistently, from the early stages of labor 
through the time he left the child, assured the family that the 
conditions they were concerned about were normal, that 
hospitalization was unnecessary, and that Ivy should "stop fussing" 
(T.Vol.I, p.66; Vol.Ill, p. 93,94,102); 
22o Defendant knew that the disease was progressive and 
that the probability of survival decreased as the disease 
progressed, yet he failed to call on the Youngs until noon the next 
day (T.Vol.IV, p.Ill); 
23. The defendant lives less than five blocks from the 
Young residence (T.Vol.IV, p.162). His office is six to eight 
blocks from the Young residence (T.Vol.IV, p. 158). He had ample 
opportunity to visit or call upon the Youngs, but did not; 
24. At approximately 6h hours after the birth, the 
defendant was awake, reading National Geographic (T.Vol.IV, p.105); 
25. Defendant remained at home for some time before 
leaving to play racquetball at a club which did not open until 8% 
hours after the birth (T.Vol.IV, p.105); 
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26. Had the defendant called on the Youngs at that time, 
he would have learned that Jareth was continuing in the grunting 
sounds* and had an abnormal color (T.Vol.I, p.91); 
27. Defendant returned from racquetball to his office 
approximately ten hours after the birth (T.Vol.IV, p.107). Had he 
checked with the Youngs at that time, the defendant would have 
learned that the baby had, at one time, stopped breathing (T.Vol.I, 
p.94) and that Ivy Young was trying to contact him; 
28. A layperson could not be expected to recognize the 
subtle changes in the progress of the disease (T.Vol.Ill, pp. 
272,273); 
29. Jareth Young died from Respiratory Distress Syndrome 
(T.Vol.Ill, p.13); 
30. By leaving the child in the care of laypersons, the 
risk of death increased 10 to 20 times — from less than one 
percent to up to fifteen percent (T.Vol.Ill, pp.278,279); and 
31. The death was preventable by hospitalization within 
a 99% degree of certainty, a fact known to the defendant 
(T.Vol.Ill, p.248)1 
These inferences are sufficient to sustain the verdict of 
the jury. 
[B] The facts of cases both in Utah and other 
jurisdictions support the conclusion that the evidence was 
sufficient to convict the defendant. 
The Utah Supreme Court has found the evidence sufficient 
to sustain a finding of criminal negligence in death. cases 
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involving less probability of death. In State v. Hallet, 619 P*2d 
335 (Utah 1980), the court found sufficient evidence to sustain a 
conviction of negligent homicide v/here the defendant, acting as an 
accomplice, bent down a stop sign so it was not visible from the 
lane of travel. In State v. McPhee, 684 P.2d 57 (Utah 1984), the 
evidence in an automobile homicide consisted of evidence of 
drinking, a state of intoxication so as to cause staggering and 
slurred speech and evidence of crossing three lanes of travel into 
the wrong lane of an intersecting street. 
In these two cases the defendants acted with negligence 
with regard to unknown but foreseeable victims. The risk of death 
was contingent upon a victim appearing upon the scene. In this 
case, there was an actual known victim and a peril of death that 
was known to the defendant and not contingent upon the arrival of 
a victim. The actuarial probability of death, given that 
contingency, must be less in those cases than the probability of 
death in the instant case. 
The Court cites caselaw dealing with "bad judgment" by a 
physician. State v. Warden, 122 Utah Adv. Rep 42, at 45. The case 
now before this Court is factually more consistent with the Montana 
case of State v. Hoffman, 639 P. 2d 567 (Montana 1982), where a 
mother was found guilty of negligent homicide for failure to 
provide medical treatment for her son. Other neighboring states 
have had similar results. In State v. Rupp, 586 P.2d 1302 (Ariz. 
App. 1978) a involuntary manslaughter charge was upheld for parents 
whose infant child died of starvation based upon failure to feed 
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the child and based upon failure to provide medical attention. 
Also, in Walker v. Superior Court (People), 763 P.2d 852 (Cal. 
1988), the California Supreme Court ruled that a parent who 
provided only "prayer treatment" to a gravely ill child was guilty 
of felony child endangerment. In Funkhouser v. Oklahoma, 763 P. 2d 
695 (Okla. Cr. 1988), the State properly charged parents who did 
not seek medical aid for their three-month-old son, who died from 
complications arising from pneumonia, with manslaughter in the 
second degree. Also, in State v. Williams, 484 P.2d 1167 (Wash. 
App. 1971) a violation of parental duty to furnish medical care to 
minor dependant child, with other elements of manslaughter being 
present, was sufficient basis on which to support a conviction for 
crime of manslaughter. 
The subject of failure to provide medical treatment is 
dealt with in Homicide—Lack of Medical Attention, 100 A.L.R.2d 483 
(1965). 
Where the defendant in this case was neither qualified nor 
authorized to provide the treatment which would have saved this 
infant's life, his duty more closely resembles that of a parent or 
other person with a contractual duty of care, than that of a 
physician fully qualified and authorized to treat. 
There is no exception from liability for criminal 
negligence for physicians. The fact that defendant is a physician 
is one of the many circumstances the jury is allowed to put in 
balance in determining the issue of criminal negligence. In People 
v. Phillips, 414 P.2d 353 (Cal. 1966), a doctor of chiropractic was 
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convicted of second degree murder where he represented he could 
cure a cancer patient without surgery and caused decedent's parents 
to remove decedent from the hospital. The California Supreme Court 
reversed the conviction based on a jury instruction on the felony 
murder rule. In reversing the conviction, however, the court ruled 
that in order to establish a homicide, evidence would have to show 
that the operation would have prolonged the patient's life. If the 
defendant's culpable act has significantly decreased the span of 
decedent's life, the law will not hear defendant's say that the 
victim would thereafter have died in any event. 
The Phillips case is similar to the instant case in that 
the defendant advised the parents that hospitalization was not 
necessary and that positioning the baby to relive the grunting 
would cure the problem. Dr. Chan testified that had the baby been 
hospitalized, the child would have survived within a 99% degree of 
certainty. 
Defendant's act was not a mere error in judgment. When the 
family suggested hospitalization, the defendant prescribed an 
alternative treatment which expert testimony showed was ineffective 
in curing the disease and instead masked the symptoms of the 
disease. 
While the statement that the State's experts testimony 
"must be construed in light of the fact that the home-delivery, 
though legal, is not a widespread practice by doctors in Utah" 
(Adv. Rep. at 45) has been extracted, the official report opinion 
continues to note that "the medical community in this state does 
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not teach or train physicians for home delivery and generally we 
recommend against it." Warden, 784 P.2d 1204, at 1209. The 
question of popularity of home delivery as a practice may be 
considered by the jury, but is not a proper question for review by 
an appellate court. 
In State v. Maxfield, 677 P.2d 519 (Idaho App. 1984) a 
naturalpathic physician was convicted of involuntary manslaughter 
after a death caused by a "colonic irrigation" which consisted of 
a series of tap water enemas to relieve the victim's sever 
constipation. 
Naturalpathic or Homeopathic medicine, prayer remedies, or 
chiropractic medicine are not taught or practiced in medical 
schools. Homebirth is not taught in Utah medical schools. The 
fact that these treatments are unusual or unpopular in the medical 
community does not disqualify a medical doctor as a witness. Such 
factors are proper issues to be weighed by the jury. The jury may 
consider those factor not only to determine the nature of the risk 
and the efforts by the defendant to minimize the risk, but also to 
assess the credibility of the expert witnesses. Once the jury has 
weighed those factors and rendered a verdict, the appellate courts 
should not disturb the verdict. See Booker, supra, at 345. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing arguments, this court should find 
that the Court of Appeals misapplied the standard of review for 
this case and reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /*./ /day of August, 1990. 
Attorney/ for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
A. Court of Appeals Opinion: State v. Warden, 122 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 42 (Ut App 1989) 
B. Official Opinion: State v. Warden, 784 P.2d 1204 (Utah 
App 1989) 
C. Court of Appeals Order denying State's Petition for 
Rehearing 
D. Utah Code Ann. §76-2-103(4) (1974) 
E. Utah Code Ann. §76-5-206 (1973) 
F. Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2 et sea. (1953, as amended) 
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A. Court of Appeals Opinion: State v. Warden. 122 Utah Adv. Rep. 42 (Ut 
App 1989) 
42 State T. Warden COO« • CO 
case, however, we believe the issue of prejudice 
relative to the gun custody issue was sufficiently 
problematic to merit analysis. 
a. For example, defendant claims his counsel should 
have argued he was incompetent to stand trial or 
lacked the capacity (o form the requisite intent to 
commit the crimes. Testimony at defendant's sent-
encing hearing, however, by Dr. Alma Carlisle, a 
Utah State Prison psychologist, negated those the-
ories. Exclusion of the theories was, therefore, a 
legitimate trial strategy. 
Gteat 
122 Utah Adv. Rep. 42 
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OPINION 
BENCH, JadsjK 
Defendant appeals bis jury conviction of 
negligent homicide, a dast A misdemeanor, In 
violation dt Utah Code Ann. §76-5-206 
(197S), ^ e reverse the conviction. 
FACTS 
Defendant David R/ Warden* Jr., is a Bee-
nsed and board-certified physician who 
began practicing family medBdna in KayiviDe, 
Utah, te 1961 As part of his practice, defen-
dant provide* obstetrical care, and ftrtmatin 
that ha has attended approximately 2500 
births, 300 of which have been home defire-
rstJ. •*- '*** - - >+ ' -
In September 19$6, defendant wag visited far 
bit office by Joanne Young, who consulted 
defendant because she was pregnant out-of-
wedlock and wanted to have her baby at 
home. Joanne testified that she was embarrtv 
ued about her pregnancy and 'didn't want to 
have to to to the hospital and have people 
know/ She also expressed a desire to keep the 
expenses of birth to a minimum. Defendant 
evaluated her for home delivery, considering 
the risks of her pregnancy, the proximity of 
hospital facilities, and the availability of 
family support to care for the infant and 
mother after birth. Defendant determined that 
Joanne's pregnancy was low risk and that 
medical facilities were nearby. He also learned 
that Joanne's mother, Ivy, was to be the 
primary caretaker after birth and that Ivy had 
given birth at home to four of her seven chil-
dren. Based on -this evaluation, defendant 
decided that Joanne was a suitable candidate 
for home delivery and agreed to attend the 
'birth. He also made arrangements to obtain 
Joanne's medical records from her previous 
doctor, and on the basis of that information 
and his own examination, calculated her deli-
very date to be in early December. 
On the morning of November 7, Joanne 
began experiencing vaginal Weeding. Ivy caBed 
defendant, who was in Salt Lake City at the 
time. Defendant expressed concern that labor 
was beginning and advised Ivy to confine 
Joanne to bed and to contact him immediately 
if the bleeding became heavier or if strong 
contractions began. That afternoon. Ivy caBed 
defendant again and told him that the WeedBnsf 
had stopped. She also told him that the ha* 
spoken with the father of the cfafld and that fat 
had told her that conception had occurred > 
month earfier than originally befieved. Defe. 
ndant testified that this information led him tfe 
think that the labor waa not premature, and 
he advised her to call again aa labor.conti** 
nuesL Ivy did id that evening, repeating that 
Joanne was having occasional coutractioM£* 
Defendant toid her to caB back when tfc* 
contractions were three to five minutes apart. 
At about 10:15 pan., Ivy informed defendant 
that the final stage of labor had begun. De£> 
endant arrived $t the house fifteen minatee 
later. **-**-. 
Shortly thereafter, Joanne gave breech berth 
to a male infant which appeared to be heasthy» 
but weighed only an estimated four to £t*e 
pounds. The baby exhibited some respirator* 
distress which defendant attributed to prems> 
turity. Defendant testified that he suggested 
hospitalization of the Infant to Ivy, but that 
Ivy was concerned because there was no health 
insurance to cover those expense*. (Ivy denied 
that she ever discussed with defendant, 
taxation of the infant.) Defendant 
Ivy how to position the infant to refleye ^ _ ^ 
of the respiratory distress and showed Joawf 
how to mine the baby. He also instu «*f Ivy 
tp keep the chfld warm fpd to monitor tfc| 
baby's temperature, color, and brathtafe 
After Instructing Ivy to cafl him if theft wjrt 
any changes in the baby's condition, defeat 
daat left at about 11;S0 p.au 
During the night, Ivy moved Joanne and dag 
baby into a warmer room. Ivy noticed that J^a 
child's hands and tM were 'very bhie,* bat 
did not caB defendant. At 1:00 a.m., the baby 
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appeared to have stopped breathing. Ivy att-
empted to resuscitate him for about twenty 
minutes, and apparently Use infant responded. 
She thai called defendant's office, but was 
told he was at home. When Ivy called defen-
dant's home, his wife advised her he was not 
there, but would be in his office by 9:30 a.m. 
In nether call did she identify herself, leave a 
message, nor report that there was any emer-
gency. She apparently was aware defendant 
was not inaccessible in such a situation, but 
did- not make further attempts to reach him. 
She did not take the infant to the hospital or 
notify emergency services. She testified that m 
England, her native home, 'you would have 
had to have a- doctor's permission to have 
called an ambulance. * 
At about 8:30 ajn., Ivy called a friend but 
did not tell her that the child was having dif-
ficulty breathing. She also called her clerg-
yman, but did not advise him until 9:30 or 
10:00 a.m. that the baby was having respira-
tory difficulty. The clergyman called a local 
pediatrician, who arrived at the Youngs' home 
at about 10:30 turn, only to find the infant 
'lifeless.' The baby was taken to a hospital, 
but was pronounced dead shortly after arrival. 
A postmortem examination revealed that the 
infant was been approximately six to seven 
weds premature and had died from respira-
tory distress caused by prematurity of the 
tangs (hyaline membrane disease). Defendant 
subsequently was charged with one count of 
negfigentbomldde. 
An Initial jury trial ended In a mistrial prior 
to the rendition of a verdict* A second Jury 
trial was hdd February 22-26, 198S, and 
defendant was convicted u charged. Defen-
dant/! motions to arrest judgment and for a 
new trial were denied* 
ISSLrfS 
Defendant' raises essentially two issues on 
appeal, arguing, for a reversal of his convic-
tion* He first claims that the State's expert 
witnesses were not qualified to testify as to the 
applicable?medical standard of care. Second, 
he argues that there was insufficient evidence 
to establish that his conduct deviated signifi-
cantly from the applicable standard of c m 
and thai there was a causal connection 
between his conduct and the baby's death. 
%
 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWOU 
Conduct instituting the crime of «*gfff*rf 
homicide occurs when an 'actor, acting with 
criminal negligence, causes the death of 
another.* Utah Code Ann. $76-5-206(1) 
(1978). Hie culpable mental state for criminal 
negligence requires 'only that a defendant 
'ought to be aware of a substantial and unj-
ustifiable risk* of death/ State r. Suodiford, 
769 P.2d 254, 267 (Utah 1988) (quoting Utah 
Code Ann. 976-2-103(4) (197*)); see also 2 
C Torda, Wharton's Criminal Law §168 
(14th ed. 1979). Furthermore, "[t]he risk must 
be of such a nature and degree that the failure 
to perceive it constitutes a grots deviation 
from the tuodard of care that an ordinary 
person would exercise in aU the circumstances 
as viewed from the actor's standpoint.9 Utah 
Code Ann. §76-2-103(4) (1978). Conseq-
uently, negligent homicide involves a defen-
dant's perception of risk and necessarily req-
uires an evaluation of his or her state of mind. 
Stale r. Wcsscadorf, Til ?Jd 523, 525-26 
(Utah O. App. 1989). Whether a defendant 
negligently fails to perceive the risk is a ques-
tion of fact for the jury. See State v. Howard, 
597 PJd 878, 881^Utah 1979). However, the 
risk of death 'must be of such a degree that 
an ordinary person would not... fail to reco-
gnize it* State v. Dyer, 671 PJd 142, 14* 
(Utah 1983). -w,^ 
Because the 'failure to perceive the risfc 
constitutes a frost deviation from the reaso-
nable man standard,' ordinary nrgflgeace 
adequate in the civil law is insufficient J© 
constitute criminal negligence. Stat* r+ 
Cham, 605 P.2d 1226, 1227 (Utah 197% * * 
abo SUDdiford, 769 PJd at 267; 2 CTorch,. 
Wharton's Criminal Law §168 (terms sud» aa 
'criminal negligence* are intended toconao* 
deviations from reasonableness 
greater hi degree than ordinary 
Thus, 'teiese inattfntkm or mistakg^ in jfidfe* 
meal resulting even in death of iuother&j|qi 
criminal unless the quality of the act j 
s o / Pcopk r. Rodrifoez* 186 
4»,8CaL Rptr. 863,868(1960% ^x y m 
KXPiarrTOTiMONiru^ J^-
Defendant contends that expert testimony; 
was required in this case to establish'or 
'standard of care,' but that the'State's 
medkal experts were not qualified to testify 
On the other hand, the Stats argues Out 
expert iftnfHcai testimony was not icquirejL 
and that it needed only to present coiuiKwiif 
evidence to show the nature and degree oTjist 
and the circumstances as viewed from"tfce 
actor's standpoint.' The State correctly obs-
erve* that the 'standard of care" in section 7* 
)-103(4) refers to the actor's mental etitfe; fc» 
opposed to medical malpractice cases in whicil 
^ B ^ k ^ ^ b ^MI • rffT • mi +m\^A&^mm~m**m*mm *—• ^ A ^ M A M ^ J mmm^ *JLm?mm*mm\ 
expert meuicai testimony is reqiureu\io snow 
the appBcabk standard of mea^,c^0SJ*& 
e .^r, CbMdwkk r. NWm, 763 P.2d I t f ; fc f 
(Utah CL App. 1988). It is tfco tn* flu* 
expert testimony if not required to prov$ t£Si 
mental state of a criminal defendant accusei 
of Homicide. See SO* v. Aoctafaa ttS 9M 
«,Sl(Ptahl97D. ** *!***> 
We" conclude, however, thai expert §*£ 
mooy wis required in this case since sues 
testimony was necessary to estabfish die nature 
and degree of risk. Section 76-5-206(1) 
requires the State to prove beyond treason-
able doubt that defendant's judgment j*as 
criminally deficient because he failed to per©* 
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dve t substantial ntk that death could occur. 
Without an understanding of the nature and 
degree of risk, the jury could not determine 
whether the nsk was substantial, and if so, 
whether defendant's failure to perceive it was 
grossly negligent. Unless the risk is one within 
the common knowledge and experience of 
laypersons, it is unlikely that a jury could 
make an informed determination of culpabi-
lity.* We believe that expert testimony is req-
uired where criminal negligence is alleged and 
the nature and degree of risk are beyond the 
ken of the average layperson. See, e.g., 
Ketcbum v. Ward, 422 F. Supp. 934 
(W.D.N.Y. 1976) (State'* use of expert 
medical testimony at trial supplied sufficient 
evidence of criminal negligence for negligent 
homicide conviction in* death of mother on 
whom physician had performed legal abor-
tion). 
Defendant argue* that the State's expert 
medical witnesses did not qualify as experts 
because they do not attend home deliveries. 
The witnesses included two obstetrician/ 
gynecologists, a pediatrician, and a neonatol-
ogist. Citing the medical malpractice case of 
Burton v. Youngbhod, 711 P.2d 245, 24* 
(Utah 1985) (a practitioner of one school o( 
medicine is not competent to testify as an 
expert against the practitioner of another 
school), defendant argues that the State's 
doctors were not qualified to testily because 
they were of a different school of medicine 
than defendant* v v* x~ 
The qualification of in expert witness ia a 
matter within the sound discretion of the trial 
couru State v. Espinoza, 723 P.2d 420, 421 
(Utah 1986). There was evidence in the record 
that there is no board certification or recogn-
ized medical specialty in home delivery. There 
was also evidence that the medical principle* 
applicable to the delivery of babies are appfl-
cable whether a birth occurs at home or in a 
hospital. In view of the record evidence, the 
trial court was within its discretion to qualify 
the State's medical witnesses as experts. Cf. 
Burton, 711 P.2d at 249 Of methods and 
procedures of general plastic surgeon were 
shown to be identical to those of spedaHzed 
plastic surgeon, one may testify against the 
other); Wesael v. Erkkson landscaping Cx+ 
711 PJd 250, 253 (Utah 1985) {nothing prec-
ludes testimony from expert In another trade If 
the standard ia the same for. both). "Hie crit-
ical factor in determining the competency of 
an expert ii whether that expert has knowledge 
that can assist the trier of fact in resolving- the 
issues before i t ' Id. at 253; see aZw OtahR. 
Bvid. 702. We conclude that the trjal court 
committed no abuse of discretion in allowing 
the State's experts to testify.
 v 
SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE 
Defendant claims that the evidence prese-
nted was Insufficient to establish guilt beyond 
a reasonable doubt. To convict a person of 
violating section 76-5-206(1), the State must 
establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, both 
prohibited conduct and a culpable mental 
state. To establish a culpable mental state, the 
prosecution must present evidence that defe-
ndant was unaware of a substantial and unj-
ustifiable risk of death, but should have been 
so aware. 
We review defendant's daim under a stan-
dard that does not permit us to substitute our 
judgment for that of the jury in a criminal 
trial. See State v. Tolman, 775 P.2d 422, 424 
(Utah CL App. 1989). Rather, 
we review the evidence and all inf-
erences which may reasonably be 
drawn from it in the tight most 
favorable to the verdict of the jury. 
We reverse a jury convkrion for 
insufficient evidence only when the 
evidence, so viewed, ia sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improb-
able that reasonable minds must 
have entertained a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant committed the 
crime of which he was convicted. 
State r. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 
1985) (quoting State r. Pctree, 659 P.2d 443, 
444 (Utah 1983)); * * a t e Statev.Hopktm, 
119 Utah Adv. Rep. 59,60(1989*. ^ ^ i ^ J 
Defendant testified at trial" Oaf W * » * , 
parents weighed the newborn c*by *nd dete-
rmined it to be about the pou^.Defcod*at 
also said he believed the baby torK^wo> 
three weeks premature. Defendanttarawar* 
that the baby was having 'gntptfef respirat-
ions,* which he said was a sign of early resp-; 
iratory dktreta syndrome. Defendant positi-
oned the baby in such a way that Jbe labored 
breathing was relieved. He further testified 
that the severity of die respiratory <fistre» did 
not indicate a need tcz Hospitalization. Ha 
said that he Informed Ivy that the baby waa 
premature and had difficulty ia breathing, hue 
that the baby was then stable. He inatructad 
Ivy to call him if there was any change and 
admitted that he was depending o * b y to 
carefully watch the infant. Before leaving the 
Young residence, defendant noted that Jj» 
respiratory difficulty had subsided, H* staffed* 
'The baby was respiring wed, tbr baby wa* 
ttffl awake and akrt and motcfe torn jmj&i * 
good/ He also said," - ' r 5 ^ *~ 
Zl was impressed that the 0 ^ * K ^ / ^ 
{, already stw^n soma s l g n a ^ i c W f c ^ 
, ^*»tory distress s y n d r o m e ^ ^ ^ « » r ^ 
_ instructed the mother 'o«f fc^ta 
nurse, having instructedTpt mother 
fa keep the baby wan%end there* 
fore 1 feh I could lee** confident 
that grandma would ca&me, conf-
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ident that if there were any progr-
ession of symptoms that I would be 
called. 
Defendant later testified that of 300 home 
births he had attended, approximately ten of 
those babies had been premature. Eight of 
those had had respiratory distress, but defen-
dant said that he had hospitalized only three 
of those eight. In the case of this infant, def-
endant testified that 'in my experience and the 
judgment that I applied at the time based on 
experience with babies who are even smaller 
than this delivered at home, they can in many 
cases get along very, very weU....' 
The State's expert medical witnesses testi-
fied that although the mother and baby 
'would do better' in a hospital, defendant's 
evaluation of the infant's well-being would 
indicate that the baby's vital signs were 
'acceptable." They conceded that the infant 
may have survived had he been hospitalized up 
to ten hours after birth, but believed that 
leaving the baby at home was 'bad judgment' 
on defendant's part.* 
The State's neonatologist testified that 
hyaline membrane disease is a progressive 
disease. He also indicated that a baby in the 
condition of the deceased is typically 'at high 
risk for medical arid surgical'problems.' As 
far as mortality for an infant with the disease,, 
however, be stated that the failure to provide 
therapy would only-plac* the probability of 
death at five to- fifteen percent. He later stated 
upon cross-examination (ha* statistically only 
two percent <x babies die from mttjeeied 
hyafine membrane disease. He further said, 1 
guess the message U it*s very unusual and rare 
to lose a baby et tbh gestation and this birth 
weight from hyaline membrane disease. * 
Asked whether it would be outside the 
medical standard of cfre to have the family of 
a home-delivered newborn to monger any 
changes in the, baby's concfition, the neonat-
ologist 'believed J* was, but conceded that 
other * competent physicians would disagree 
with him. This response merely reinforces our 
conclusion that his testimony, as wefl * that 
of the other experts for the State, must be 
construed in light of the fact that home dell-
very, though legal, is not a widespread prac-
tice by doctors hi Utah. The State's experts 
testified that the medical community fii this 
state does not teach or train physicians ^ for 
home delivery Mid generally recommends 
against it. / • * - • • A 
We are convinced that eves looking at the 
evidence in the fight most favorable to the 
verdict, that evidence was 'sufficiently inco-
nclusive' to estabfiih that t&ert was a subst* 
ndal and unjustifiable risk o f death such that 
defendant should have been aware oi it* Thus, 
reasonable minds could examine the evidence 
presented and entertain *a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant committed the crime of 
which he was convicted.' See Booket, 709 
P.2dat345. 
Since we conclude that the evidence failed to 
establish criminal negligence, we need not 
reach the issue whether defendant's acts or 
omissions were the legal cause of death. 
Defendant's conviction is reversed. 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
I CONCUR: 
J. Robert Bullock, Judge 
1. J. Robert Bullock, Senior District Judse, ottins 
by jpedad appointment pursuant to Utah Code Aim. 
{7S-3-24(!0)<$upp.l*9. 
2. This is distinct from expert testimony as to the 
subjective intent of the defendant, Le., 'the actor's 
viewpoint,' which need net be accepted by the court 
and which is ultimately a determination for the jury. 
X Our reMarch has revealed very few cases la which 
licensed physicians have been charged with negfigcot 
homiode. la many of those cases where feck a 
charge has been brought, albeit under differing 
statutes, the courts have held that no criminal Sae-
flity tttaches when death results from aa error of 
judgment. See geotnQy Annotation, Homicide 
Predicated am Improper Treatment of Dbmm or 
Injury.45AXJUd 114(197?). . - - ^ . 
, 5 \m ,. 
GREENWOOD, Judge: (cofjcurrjng $mi * 
I concur in Judge Bench's op&tfdff 46ocer-
ning expert testimony, btxt cfisseat^frbei the 
opmton's coodusion that there wWWtufT-
idem evidete to wsta&r the ji^rc&rfktktt 
of nffflgfw^ lipfFtlffcip.-* Tog majtfnt* opinion 
correctly stages the accessary 4»afifhia Of evi-
dence for negligent homicide as befhg where 
the defendant should Ti*v* teen aware of a 
substantial and unjustified r t t of iSeatfe hot 
was not SUte t. Wessakkktjr T77 r\2d 523, 
525 (Utah Ct App. 1989). Abo, the risk must 
be todi that u ordinary penoft would not, 
disregard or fail to rccotniat It S$if» rrDyer, 
671 P.2d 142, 14S (Hah 190). l W * 3 f t , in 
case, the State was 'required to convince 
the Jury that there was a subsrarrtiaF said unj-
ustified risk that to l i A o i T * ^ 
not receive mtrikai eve In a nospfial-type 
setting; (hat defendant was tmaware that the 
risk existed; and that an ordinary person in 
defendant's position would have jocorirtted 
that risk. Off task a**a ijppeSatf ^Sftrfc ***> 
determine^  i T t h ^ ev i&to p f t s t t ^ w W 
viewed favorably to thelury ve*tfciT'1Vsuff-
iciently incondusivsr or Inherenfly^iibprobdbt* 
that reasonable Grinds must fcav* esfterttneda 
reasonable doubt that the defendant eommi-
tted the crime of which hi iras convicted^ 5ttt» 
v. B o 0 * e > r « r > - S T ^ t t S , - T 4 5 (Utah 
1915) (quoting State v. Petnee, 454 P<2d 443, 
444 (19Cty - ^ w , . 
My assessment oftthe evidence tapporting 
the jury verdkt is as follows: defendant was a 
licensed physician who had maintained a 
family practice since 1968, including obstetr-
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ical care; defendant assunmri responsibility for 
the infant's physical well-beta* by agreeing 
to deliver it at home; defendant did not insist 
on examining the mother when she reported 
vaginal bleeding to determine if premature 
birth was likely or if so, what precautions 
should be taken to minimize the likelihood of 
premature birth; defendant diagnosed the 
infant after birth *s having Respiratory Dist-
ress Syndrome; defendant advised Ivy to 
position the infant in a way which relieved the 
symptoms but would not aOevihte the condi-
tion itself; defendant minimizrd the serious-
ness of the infant's condition to Ivy and 
Joanne; three of the ten children he had deli-
vered who had Respiratory Distress Syndrome 
were hospitalized; defendant knew the infant 
could die from the disease and that the disease 
was progressive; defendant could not himself 
admit the infant into a hospital because he 
lacked malpractice insurance, so would have 
to call another physician or have the infant 
admitted through an emergency room facility; 
Ivy testified .that defendant only told her to 
watch the infant for changes in his tempera-
ture, color and respiration, without advising 
her as to the degree of change which might 
indicate a crisis, nor did he warn her or 
Joanne that death could result > from the 
disease; and defendant left the infant in die 
cart of laypersons. 
There was other, conflicting evidence which 
wpuld indicate that defendant should not have 
been aware that a substantial risk existed. 
However, the existence of conflicting evidence, 
by itself, does not justify reversal of a jury 
verdkt. State r. Tabu** 775 P.2d 422, 424-
25 (Utah CL App. 1989). The jury has been 
through the arduous task of listening to and 
swetstng the evidence presented in this most 
difficult case, and I do not think that we 
should appropriately substitute our judgment 
fc: that of the jury. The jury's conclusion was 
based on what defendant knew or the jury 
believed he knew at the time, and its assess-
ment that given that knowledge he should 
have known the risks. I do not find the evid-
ence 'sufficiently inconclusive,9 as do my 
colleagues, to justify conviction. I would 
conclude that the record, while heatedly con-
troverted, contains sufficient evidence for the 
jury to conclude that defendant should, have 
been aware tfeat a substantial and unjustified 
risk of death existed, and to convict defendant 
&f negligent homicide as a result. 
Pamela T. Greenwood* Judge 
122 Utah Adv. Rtp. 4$ 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
REGIONAL SALES AGENCY, INC., a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, Appellant, and Cross-
Respondent, 
v. 
Roland W. RQCHERT, 
Defendant, Respondent, and Cross-
Appeuant* 
No. S30244-CA 
FILED: November 24,19*9 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
Honorable Pat B. Brian 
ATTORNEYS: 
Bryce E. Roe, Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
and Cross-Respondent 
E.H. Fankhauser, Salt Lake City, for 
Respondent and Cross-Appellant 
Before Judges Bench, Billings, and 
Greenwood. tpOPINION - -
SELLINGS, Jndge: 
Regional Saks Agency, Inc. ('Regional") 
appeals from a jury verdict awarding it 
S792.lt in damages as a result; of cross-
appellant Rokri Rekhert*s <Ttfr^ Rptficrt*) 
breach of a non-competition agreement with 
Regional, his former employer. Regional abo 
appeals the trial court's reduction of Its atto- -
rney fees which Regional daixns were provided 
for by the parties' written contract and reas-
onably incurred in prosecuting this action. 
Mr. Rekhert cross-appeals the court's 
de*L«l of his attempt to an»end his counterc-
laim to add a daim for unpaid commissions 
and salary. We reverse and remand In, part, 
and affirm in part. 
Since the late 1950s, Edward and Helen 
JGbolm have operated a small family business 
which acted as a manufacturer's representative 
in rirsignatfri territories of the mountain west. 
The business earned commissions from ita 
prindpal manufacturers by selling their foock 
to retatag*,' - . \ . . V ~ 
In 1977. the Khoims hired MrT Rekhert as 
an Independent contractor to handle outside 
sales. If the relationship was satisfactory, the 
Kiholms Intended to retire in ten years with 
Mr. Rekhert taking over the'Wness. Mr. 
Rekhert worked for the KStgtmTuntfl J97S . 
when the business was ineor&ratei as Regi-
onal* - * \ -V. 
In 1979, Mr. Rekhert entered Into a written 
employupnt contract with Regional. The 
employment contract contains a non-
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Defendant finally claims that his right to 
compulsory process and discovery was de-
nied by the quashing of his subpoenas duc-
es tecum at the preliminary hearing. In 
quashing defendant's subpoenas, the mag-
istrate instructed defendant to follow the 
provisions of rule 16 of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure in his discovery efforts. 
Defendant apparently followed this instruc-
tion with the State's cooperation. The 
record is devoid of any expression of dis-
satisfaction or objection to this method of 
discovery, and there is no evidence that 
defendant was prejudiced. 
Having reviewed defendant's other 
claims of error, we find them to be without 
merit. 
Affirmed. 
HOWE, Associate C.J., and 
STEWART and DURHAM, JJ., concur. 
ZIMMERMAN, J., concurs in the 
result. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
David R. WARDEN, Jr., M.D., 
Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 880575-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Nov. 22, 1989. 
Rehearing Denied Jan. 29, 1990. 
Physician was convicted of negligent 
homicide in regard to his home delivery of 
infant by the Second Circuit Court, Layton 
Department, K. Roger Bean, J., and physi-
cian appealed. The Court of Appeals, 
Bench, J., held that: (1) expert testimony 
was required; (2) experts were properly 
qualified; and (3) evidence was insufficient 
to support conviction. 
Reversed. 
Greenwood, J., filed opinion concurring 
in part and dissenting in part. 
1. Homicide <£=»74 
Negligent homicide involves defen-
dant's perception of risk and necessarily 
requires evaluation of his or her state of 
mind. 
2. Homicide <s=282 
Whether defendant negligently fails to 
perceive risk and thus is guilty of negligent 
homicide is question of fact for jury. 
3. Homicide <s=*230 
Expert testimony is not required to 
prove mental state of criminal defendant 
accused of homicide. 
4. Homicide <£=>250 
Expert testimony was required in trial 
of physician for negligent homicide of in-
fant he delivered at mother's home; with-
out understanding of nature and degree of 
risk, jury could not determine whether risk 
was substantial and if so, whether physi-
cian's failure to perceive it was grossly 
negligent and risk was not one within com-
mon knowledge and experience of layper-
sons. 
5. Cimina! Law <s=479 
State's medical witnesses were proper-
ly qualified as experts to testify against 
physician charged with negligent homicide 
in home delivery of infant, despite fact that 
experts did not attend home deliveries; no 
board certification or recognized medical 
specialty in home delivery existed and 
medical principles applicable to delivery of 
infants were applicable regardless of 
whether birth occurs at home or in hospi-
tal. 
6. Homicide <s=*250 
Evidence was insufficient to sustain 
conviction of physician on -charge of negli-
gent homicide in home delivery of infant, in 
regard to physician's failure to hospitalize 
infant who was born with respiratory dis-
tress; expert medical witnesses testified 
STATE v. 
Cite as 784 ?2d 12 
that when physician left patient's home, 
baby's vital signs were acceptable, and that 
it was very unusual for child to die at this 
gestation and birth weight from hyaline 
membrane disease. 
Darwin C. Hansen, Bountiful, for defen-
dant and appellant. 
Melvin C. Wilson and Brian J. Namba, 
Farmington, for plaintiff and respondent. 
OPINION 
Before BENCH, GREENWOOD and 
BULLOCK,1 JJ. 
BENCH, Judge: 
Defendant appeals his jury conviction of 
negligent homicide, a class A misdemeanor, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-206 
(1978). We reverse the conviction. 
FACTS 
Defendant David R. Warden, Jr., is a 
licensed and board-certified physician who 
began practicing family medicine in Kays-
ville, Utah, in 1968. As part of his prac-
tice, defendant provides obstetrical care, 
and estimates that he has attended approxi-
mately 2500 births, 300 of which have been 
home deliveries. 
In September 1986, defendant was visit-
ed in his office by Joanne Young, who 
consulted defendant because she was preg-
nant out-of-wedlock and wanted to have 
her baby at home. Joanne testified that 
she was embarrassed about her pregnancy 
and "didn't want to have to go to the 
hospital and have people know." She also 
expressed a desire to keep the expenses of 
birth to a minimum. Defendant evaluated 
her for home delivery, considering the risks 
of her pregnancy, the proximity of hospital 
facilities, and the availability of family sup-
port to care for the infant and mother after 
birth. Defendant determined that Joanne's 
pregnancy was low risk and that medical 
facilities were nearby. He also learned 
that Joanne's mother, Ivy, was to be the 
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primary caretaker after birth and that Ivy 
had given birth at home to four of her 
seven children. Based on this evaluation, 
defendant decided that Joanne was a suit-
able candidate for home delivery and 
agreed to attend the birth. He also made 
arrangements to obtain Joanne's medical 
records from her previous doctor, and on 
the basis of that information and his own 
examination, calculated her delivery date to 
be in early December. 
On the morning of November 7, Joanne 
began experiencing vaginal bleeding. Ivy 
called defendant, who was in Salt Lake 
City at the time. Defendant expressed con-
cern that labor was beginning and advised 
Ivy to confine Joanne to bed and to contact 
him immediately if the bleeding became 
heavier or if strong contractions began. 
That afternoon, Ivy called defendant again 
and told him that the bleeding had stopped. 
She also told him that she had spoken with 
the father of the child and that he had told 
her that conception had occurred a month 
earlier than originally believed. Defendant 
testified that this information led him to 
think that the labor was not premature, 
and he advised her to call again as labor 
continued. Ivy did so that evening, report-
ing that Joanne was having occasional con-
tractions. Defendant told her to call back 
when the contractions were three to five 
minutes apart. At about 10:15 p.m., Ivy 
informed defendant that the final stage of 
labor had begun. Defendant arrived at the 
house fifteen minutes later. 
Shortly thereafter, Joanne gave breech 
birth to a male infant which appeared to be 
healthy, but weighed only an estimated 
four to five pounds. The baby exhibited 
some respiratory distress which defendant 
attributed to prematurity. Defendant tes-
tified that he suggested hospitalization of 
the infant to Ivy, but S * w Ivy was con-
cerned because there was no health insur-
ance to cover those expenses. (Ivy denied 
that she ever discussed with defendant hos-
pitalization of the infant.) Defendant in-
structed Ivy how to position the infant to 
1. J. Robert Bullock, Senior District Judge, sit- Code Ann. § 78-3-24(10) (Supp.1989). 
ting by special appointment pursuant to Utah 
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relieve some of the respiratory distress and 
showed Joanne how to nurse the baby. He 
also instructed Ivy to keep the child warm 
and to monitor the baby's temperature, col-
or, and breathing. After instructing Ivy to 
call him if there were any changes in the 
baby's condition, defendant left at about 
11:30 p.m. 
During the night, Ivy moved Joanne and 
the baby into a warmer room. Ivy noticed 
that the child's hands and feet were "very 
blue," but did not call defendant. At 8:00 
a.m., the baby appeared to have stopped 
breathing. Ivy attempted to resuscitate 
him for about twenty minutes, and appar-
ently the infant responded. She then 
called defendant's office, but was told he 
was at home. When Ivy called defendant's 
home, his wife advised her he was not 
there, but would be in his office by 9:30 
a.m. In neither call did she identify her-
self, leave a message, nor report that there 
was any emergency. She apparently was 
aware defendant was not inaccessible in 
such a situation, but did not make further 
attempts to reach him. She did not take 
the infant to the hospital or notify emer-
gency services. She testified that in Eng-
land, her native home, "you would have 
had to have a doctor's permission to have 
called an ambulance." 
At about 8:30 a.m., Ivy called a friend 
but did not tell her that the child was 
having difficulty breathing. She also 
called her clergyman, but did not advise 
him until 9:30 or 10:00 a.m. that the baby 
was having respiratory difficulty. The 
clergyman called a local pediatrician, who 
arrived at the Youngs' home at about 10:30 
a.m. only to find the infant "lifeless." The 
baby was taken to a hospital, but was 
pronounced dead shortly after arrival. 
A postmortem examination revealed that 
the infant was born approximately six to 
seven weeks premature and had died from 
respiratory distress caused by prematurity 
of the lungs (hyaline membrane disease). 
Defendant subsequently was charged with 
one count of negligent homicide. 
An initial jury trial ended in a mistrial 
prior to the rendition of a verdict. A sec-
ond jury trial was held February 22-26, 
1988, and defendant was convicted as 
charged. Defendant's motions to arrest 
judgment and for a new trial were denied. 
ISSUES 
Defendant raises essentially two issues 
on appeal, arguing for a reversal of his 
conviction. He first claims that the State's 
expert witnesses were not qualified to tes-
tify as to the applicable medical standard 
of care. Second, he argues that there was 
insufficient evidence to establish that his 
conduct deviated significantly from the ap-
plicable standard of care and that there 
was a causal connection between his con-
duct and the baby's death. 
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
[1,2] Conduct constituting the crime of 
negligent homicide occurs when an "actor, 
acting with criminal negligence, causes the 
death of another." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-5-206(1) (1978). The culpable mental 
state for criminal negligence requires "only 
that a defendant 'ought to be aware of a 
substantial and unjustifiable risk' of 
death." State v. Standiford, 769 P.2d 254, 
267 (Utah 1988) (quoting Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-2-103(4) (1978)); see also 2 C. Torcia, 
Wharton's Criminal Law § 168 (14th ed. 
1979). Furthermore, "[t]he risk must be of 
such a nature and degree that the failure 
to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation 
from the standard of care that an ordinary 
person would exercise in all the circum-
stances as viewed from the actor's stand-
point." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(4) 
(1978). Consequently, negligent homicide 
involves a defendant's perception of risk 
and necessarily requires an evaluation of 
his or her state of mind. State v. Wessen-
dorf, 777 P.2d 523, 525-26 (Utah Ct.App. 
1989). Whether a defendant negligently 
fails to perceive the risk is a question of 
fact for the jury. See State v. Howard, 
597 P.2d 878, 881 (Utah 1979). However, 
the risk of death "must be of such a degree 
that an ordinary person would not . . . fail 
to recognize it." State v. Dyer, 671 P.2d 
142, 148 (Utah 1983). 
STATE v. WARDEN 
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Because the "failure to perceive the risk 
constitutes a gross deviation from the rea-
sonable man standard/' ordinary negli-
gence adequate in the civil law is insuffi-
cient to constitute criminal negligence. 
State v. Chavez, 605 P.2d 1226, 1227 (Utah 
1979); see also Standiford, 769 P.2d at 
267; 2 C. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Law 
§ 168 (terms such as "criminal negligence'' 
are intended to connote deviations from 
reasonableness significantly greater in de-
gree than ordinary negligence). Thus, 
"[m]ere inattention or mistake in judgment 
resulting even in death of another is not 
criminal unless the quality of the act makes 
it so." People v. Rodriguez, 186 Cal. 
App.2d 433, 8 Cal.Rptr. 863, 868 (1960). 
EXPERT TESTIMONY 
[3] Defendant contends that expert tes-
timony was required in this case to estab-
lish the "standard of care," but that the 
State's medical experts were not qualified 
to testify. On the other hand, the State 
argues that expert medical testimony was 
not required, and that it needed only to 
present "competent evidence to show the 
nature and degree of risk and the circum-
stances as viewed from the actor's stand-
point." The State correctly observes that 
the "standard of care" in section 76-2-
103(4) refers to the actor's mental state, as 
opposed to medical malpractice cases in 
which expert medical testimony is required 
to show the applicable standard of medical 
care. See, e.g., Chadwick v. Nielsen, 763 
P.2d 817, 821 (Utah CtApp.1988). It is 
also true that expert testimony is not re-
quired to prove the mental state of a crimi-
nal defendant accused of homicide. See 
State v. Nicholson, 585 P.2d 60, 63 (Utah 
1978). 
[4] We conclude, however, that expert 
testimony was required in this case since 
such testimony was necessary to establish 
the nature and degree of risk. Section 
76-5-206(1) requires the State to prove be-
yond a reasonable doubt that defendant's 
judgment was criminally deficient because 
2. This is distinct from expert testimony as to the 
subjective intent of the defendant, i.e., "the ac-
tor's viewpoint," which need not be accepted by 
he failed to perceive a substantial risk that 
death could occur. Without an under-
standing of the nature and degree of risk, 
the jury could not determine whether the 
risk was substantial, and if so, whether 
defendant's failure to perceive it was 
grossly negligent. Unless the risk is one 
within the common knowledge and experi-
ence of laypersons, it is unlikely that a jury 
could make an informed determination of 
culpability.2 We believe that expert testi-
mony is required where criminal negligence 
is alleged and the nature and degree of risk 
are beyond the ken of the average layper-
son. See, e.g., Ketchum v. Ward, 422 
F.Supp. 934 (W.D.N.Y.1976) (State's use of 
expert medical testimony at trial supplied 
sufficient evidence of criminal negligence 
for negligent homicide conviction in death 
of mother on whom physician had per-
formed legal abortion). 
[5] Defendant argues that the State's 
expert medical witnesses did not qualify as 
experts because they do not attend home 
deliveries. The witnesses included two ob-
stetrician/gynecologists, a pediatrician, and 
a neonatologist. Citing the medical mal-
practice case of Burton v. Youngblood, 
711 P.2d 245, 248 (Utah 1985) (a practition-
er of one school of medicine is not compe-
tent to testify as an expert against the 
practitioner of another school), defendant 
argues that the State's doctors were not 
qualified to testify because they were of a 
different school of medicine than defen-
dant. 
The qualification of an expert witness is 
a matter within the sound discretion of the 
trial court. State v. Espinoza, 723 P.2d 
420, 421 (Utah 1986). There was evidence 
in the record that there is no board certifi-
cation or recognized medical specialty in 
home delivery. There was also evidence 
that the medical principles applicable to the 
delivery of babies are applicable whether a 
birth occurs at home or in a hospital. In 
view of the record evidence, the trial court 
was within its discretion to qualify the 
State's medical witnesses as experts. Cf 
the court and which is ultimately a determina-
tion for the jury. 
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Burton, 711 P.2d at 249 (if methods and 
procedures of general plastic surgeon were 
shown to be identical to those of specialized 
plastic surgeon, one may testify against 
the other); Wessel v. Erickson Landscap-
ing Co., 711 P.2d 250, 253 (Utah 1985) 
(nothing precludes testimony from expert 
in another trade if the standard is the same 
for both). 'The critical factor in determin-
ing the competency of an expert is whether 
that expert has knowledge that can assist 
the trier of fact in resolving the issues 
before i t" Id. at 253; see also Utah 
R.Evid. 702. We conclude that the trial 
court committed no abuse of discretion in 
allowing the State's experts to testify. 
SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE 
[6] Defendant claims that the evidence 
presented was insufficient to establish 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. To con-
vict a person of violating section 76-5-
206(1), the State must establish, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, both prohibited conduct 
and a culpable mental state. To establish a 
culpable mental state, the prosecution must 
present evidence that defendant was un-
aware of a substantial and unjustifiable 
risk of death, but should have been so 
aware. 
We review defendant's claim under a 
standard that does not permit us to substi-
tute our judgment for that of the jury in a 
criminal trial. See State v. Tolman, 775 
P.2d 422, 424 (Utah Ct.App.1989). Rather, 
we review the evidence and all inferences 
which may reasonably be drawn from it 
in the light most favorable to the verdict 
of the jury. We reverse a jury convic-
tion for insufficient evidence only when 
the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable 
that reasonable minds must have enter-
tained a reasonable doubt that the defen-
dant, committed the crime of which he 
was convicted. 
State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 
1985) (quoting State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 
443, 444 (Utah 1983)); see also State v. 
Hopkins, 782 P.2d 475, 477. (Utah 1989). 
Defendant testified at trial that the 
grandparents weighed the newborn baby 
and determined it to be about five pounds. 
Defendant also said he believed the baby to 
be two to three weeks premature. Defen-
dant was aware that the baby was having 
"grunting respirations," which he said was 
a sign of early respiratory distress syn-
drome. Defendant positioned the baby in 
such a way that the labored breathing was 
relieved. He further testified that the se-
verity of the respiratory distress did not 
indicate a need for hospitalization. He said 
that he informed Ivy that the baby was 
premature and had difficulty in breathing, 
but that the baby was then stable. He 
instructed Ivy to call him if there was any 
change and admitted that he was depend-
ing on Ivy to carefully watch the infant 
Before leaving the Young residence, defen-
dant noted that the respiratory difficulty 
had subsided. He stated, 'The baby was 
respiring well, the baby was still awake 
and alert and muscle tone was still good." 
He also said, 
I was impressed that the baby had al-
ready shown some signs of respiratory 
distress syndrome, but under similar cir-
cumstances in the past, I have left babies 
at home, having instructed the mother on 
how to nurse, having instructed the 
mother to keep the baby warm and there-
fore I felt I could leave, confident that 
grandma would call me, confident that if 
there were any progression of symptoms 
that I would be called. 
Defendant later ^ testified that of 300 
home births he had attended, approximate-
ly ten of those babies had been premature. 
Eight of those had had respiratory distress, 
but defendant said that he had hospitalized 
only three of those eight In the case of 
this infant, defendant testified that "in my 
experience and the judgment that I applied 
at the time based on experience with babies 
who are even smaller than this delivered at 
home, they can in many cases get along 
very, very well " 
The State's expert medical witnesses tes-
tified that although the mother and baby 
"would do better" in a hospital, defendant's 
evaluation of the infant's well-being would 
indicate that the baby's vital signs were 
"acceptable." They conceded that the in-
STATE v. WARDEN 
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fant may have survived had he been hospi-
talized up to ten hours after birth, but 
believed that leaving the baby at home was 
"bad judgment" on defendant's part.3 
The State's neonatologist testified that 
hyaline membrane disease is a progressive 
disease. He also indicated that a baby in 
the condition of the deceased is typically 
"at high risk for medical and surgical prob-
lems." As far as mortality for an infant 
with the disease, however, he stated that 
the failure to provide therapy would only 
place the probability of death at five to 
fifteen percent. He later stated upon 
cross-examination that statistically only 
two percent of babies die from untreated 
hyaline membrane disease. He further 
said, "I guess the message is it's very 
unusual and rare to lose a baby at this 
gestation and this birth weight from hya-
line membrane disease." 
Asked whether it would be outside the 
medical standard of care to have the family 
of a home-delivered newborn to monitor 
any changes in the baby's condition, the 
neonatologist believed it was, but conceded 
that other competent physicians would dis-
agree with him. Other experts for the 
State testified that the medical community 
in Utah does not teach or train physicians 
for home delivery and generally recom-
mends against it. 
We are convinced that even looking at 
the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the verdict, that evidence was "sufficiently 
inconclusive" to establish that there was a 
substantial and unjustifiable risk of death 
such that defendant should have been 
aware of it. Thus in examining the evi-
dence presented, reasonable minds must 
have entertained "a reasonable doubt that 
the defendant committed the crime of 
which he was convicted." See Booker, 709 
P.2d at 345. 
Since we conclude that the evidence 
failed to establish criminal negligence, we 
need not reach the issue whether defen-
3. Our research has revealed very few cases in 
which licensed physicians have been charged 
with negligent homicide. In many of those 
cases where such a charge has been brought, 
albeit under differing statutes, the courts have 
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omissions were the legal dant's acts or 
cause of death. 
Defendant's conviction is reversed. 
BULLOCK, J., concurs. 
GREENWOOD, Judge: (concurring 
and dissenting). 
I concur in Judge Bench's opinion con-
cerning expert testimony, but dissent from 
the opinion's conclusion that there was not 
sufficient evidence to sustain the jury's 
conviction of negligent homicide. The ma-
jority opinion correctly states the necessary 
quantum of evidence for negligent homi-
cide as being where the defendant should 
have been aware of a substantial and un-
justified risk of death, but was not. State 
v. Wessendorf, 777 P.2d 523, 525 (Utah 
Ct.App. 1989). Also, the risk must be such 
that an ordinary person would not dis-
regard or fail to recognize it. State v. 
Dyer, 671 P.2d 142, 148 (Utah 1983). 
Therefore, in this case, the State was re-
quired to convince the jury that there was 
a substantial and unjustified risk that the 
infant would die if he did not receive medi-
cal care in a hospital-type setting; that 
defendant was unaware that the risk exist-
ed; and that an ordinary person in defen-
dant's position would have recognized that 
risk. Our task as an appellate court, is to 
determine if the evidence presented, when 
viewed favorably to the jury verdict, "is 
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently im-
probable that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed the crime of which he 
was convicted." State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 
342, 345 (Utah 1985) (quoting State v. Pe-
tree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (1983)). 
My assessment of the evidence support-
ing the jury verdict is as follows: defen-
dant was a licensed physician who had 
maintained a family practice since 1968, 
including obstetrical care; defendant as-
sumed responsibility for the infant's physi-
cal well-being by agreeing to deliver it at 
held that no criminal liability attaches when 
death results from an error of judgment. See 
generally Annotation, Homicide Predicated on 
Improper Treatment of Disease or Injury, 45 A.L. 
R.3d 114 (1972). 
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home; defendant did not insist on exam-
ining the mother when she reported vaginal 
bleeding to determine if premature birth 
was likely or if so, what precautions should 
be taken to minimize the likelihood of pre-
mature birth; defendant diagnosed the in-
fant after birth as having Respiratory Dis-
tress Syndrome; defendant advised Ivy to 
position the infant in a way which relieved 
the symptoms but would not alleviate the 
condition itself; defendant minimized the 
seriousness of the infant's condition to Ivy 
and Joanne; three of the ten children he 
had delivered who had Respiratory Dis-
tress Syndrome were hospitalized; defen-
dant knew the infant could die from the 
disease and that the disease was progres-
sive; defendant could not himself admit the 
infant into a hospital because he lacked 
malpractice insurance, so would have to 
call another physician or have the infant 
admitted through an emergency room facil-
ity; Ivy testified that defendant only told 
her to watch the infant for changes in his 
temperature, color and respiration, without 
advising her as to the degree of change 
which might indicate a crisis, nor did he 
warn her or Joanne that death could result 
from the disease; and defendant left the 
infant in the care of laypersons. 
There was other, conflicting evidence 
which would indicate that defendant should 
not have been aware that a substantial risk 
existed. Hr^rever, the existence of con-
flicting evidence, by itself, does not justify 
reversal of'a jury verdict. State v. Tol-
man, 775 P.2d 422, 424-25 (Utah CtApp. 
1989). The jury has been through the ar-
duous task of listening to and assessing the 
evidence presented in this most difficult 
case, and I do not think that we should 
appropriately substitute our judgment for 
that of the jury. The jury's conclusion was 
based on what defendant knew or the jury 
be^eved he knew at the time, and its as-
sessment that given that knowledge he 
should have known the risks. I do not find 
the evidence "sufficiently inconclusive/' as 
do my colleagues, to justify conviction. I . 
would conclude that the record, while heat-
edly controverted, contains sufficient evi-
dence for the jury to conclude that defen-
dant should have been aware that a sub-
stantial and unjustified risk of death exist-
ed, and to convict defendant of negligent 
homicide as a result. 
REGIONAL SALES AGENCY, INC., a 
Utah corporation, Plaintiff, Appellant, 
and Cross-Respondent, 
v. 
Roland W. REICHERT, Defendant, 
Respondent, and Cross-Appellant 
No. 880246-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Nov. 24, 1989. 
Employer brought action against sales-
man for breach of noncompetition agree-
ment. After denying salesman's motion to 
amend counterclaim, the Third District 
Court, Salt Lake County, Pat B. Brian, J., 
entered judgment on jury verdict awarding 
slightly less than $800 in damages and 
awarded contractual attorney fees in 
amount of $7,500 rather than almost $27,-
000 that had been sought. Parties appeal-
ed. The Court of Appeals, Billings, J., held 
that: (1) salesman bore burden of proving 
that there was no reasonable relationship 
between actual damages suffered by em-
ployer as result of his breach and amount 
employer would collect under agreement's 
liquidated damages provision; (2) liqui-
dated damages provision was not unreason-
able as a matter of law; (3) unexplained 
reduction of attorney fees sought could not 
stand on appeal; and (4) motion to amend 
counterclaim was properly denied. 
Affirmed in part, reversed and re-
manded in part. 
1. Damages <s=>163(3) 
In context of noncompetition agree-
ment's liquidated damages provision, sales-
C. Court of Appeals Order denying State's Petition for Rehearing 
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BENCH, Judge: 
Defendant appeals his jury conviction of negligent homicide, 
a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-206 
(1978). We reverse the conviction. 
FACTS 
Defendant David R. Warden, Jr., is a licensed and board-
certified physician who began practicing family medicine in 
Kaysville, Utah, in 1968. As part of his practice, defendant 
provides obstetrical care, and estimates that he has attended 
approximately 2500 births, 300 of which have been home 
deliveries. 
In September 1986, defendant was visited in his office by 
Joanne Young, who consulted defendant because she was pregnant 
out-of-wedlock and wanted to have her baby at home. Joanne 
1. J. Robert Bullock, Senior District Judge, sitting by special 
appointment pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-24(10) (Supp. 
1989) . 
testified that she was embarrassed about her pregnancy and 
"didn't want to have to go to the hospital and have.people-
know.'9 She also expressed a desire to keep the expenses*ot 
birth to a minimum. Defendant evaluated her for home delivery, 
considering the risks of her pregnancy, the proximity of 
hospital facilities, and the availability of family support to 
care for the infant and mother after birth. Defendant 
determined that Joanne's pregnancy was low risk and that medical 
facilities were nearby. He also learned that Joanne's mother, 
Ivy, was to be the primary caretaker after birth and that Ivy 
had given birth at home to four of her seven children. Based on 
this evaluation, defendant decided that Joanne was a suitable 
candidate for home delivery and agreed to attend the birth. He 
also made arrangements to obtain Joanne's medical records from 
her previous doctor, and on the basis of that information and 
his own examination, calculated her delivery date to be in early 
December. 
On the morning of November 7, Joanne began experiencing 
vaginal bleeding. Ivy called defendant, who was in Salt Lake 
City at the time. Defendant expressed concern that labor was 
beginning and advised Ivy to confine Joanne to bed and to 
contact him immediately if the bleeding became heavier or if 
strong contractions began. That afternoon, Ivy called defendant 
again and told him that the bleeding had stopped. She also told 
him that she had spoken with the father of the child and that he 
had told her that conception had occurred a month earlier than 
originally believed. Defendant testified that this information 
led him to think that the labor was not premature, and he 
advised her to call again as labor continued. Ivy did so that 
evening, reporting that Joanne was having occasional 
contractions. Defendant told her to call back when the 
contractions were three to five minutes apart. At about 10:15 
p.m., Ivy informed defendant that the final stage of labor had 
begun. Defendant arrived at the house fifteen minutes later. 
Shortly thereafter, Joanne gave breech birth to a male 
infant which appeared to be healthy, but weighed only an 
estimated four to five pounds. The baby exhibited some 
respiratory distress which defendant attributed to prematurity. 
Defendant testified that he suggested hospitalization of the 
infant to Ivy, but that Ivy was concerned because there was no 
health insurance to cover those expenses. (Ivy denied that she 
ever discussed with defendant hospitalization of the infant.) 
Defendant instructed Ivy how to position the infant to relieve 
some of the respiratory distress and showed Joanne how to nurse 
the baby. He also instructed Ivy to keep the child warm and to 
monitor the baby's temperature, color, and breathing. After 
instructing Ivy to call him if there were any changes in the 
baby's condition, defendant left at about 11:30 p.m. 
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During the night/ Ivy moved Joanne and the baby into a 
warmer room. Ivy noticed that the child's hands and feet were 
"very blue," but did not call defendant. At 8:00 a.m., the baby 
appeared to have stopped breathing. Ivy attempted to 
resuscitate him for about twenty minutes, and apparently the 
infant responded. She then called defendant's office, but was 
told he was at home. When Ivy called defendant's home, his wife 
advised her he was not there, but would be in his office by 9:30 
a.m. In neither call did she identify herself, leave a message, 
nor report that there was any emergency. She apparently was 
aware defendant was not inaccessible in such a situation, but 
did not make further attempts to reach him. She did not take 
the infant to the hospital or notify emergency services. She 
testified that in England, her native home, "you would have had 
to have a doctor's permission to have called an ambulance." 
At about 8:30 a.m., Ivy called a friend but did not tell her 
that the child was having difficulty breathing. She also called 
her clergyman, but did not advise him until 9:30 or 10:00 a.m. 
that the baby was having respiratory difficulty. The clergyman 
called a local pediatrician, who arrived at the Youngs' home at 
about 10:30 a.m. only to find the infant "lifeless." The baby 
was taken to a hospital, but was pronounced dead shortly after 
arrival. 
A postmortem examination revealed that the infant was born 
approximately six to seven weeks premature and had died from 
respiratory distress caused by prematurity of the lungs (hyaline 
membrane disease). Defendant subsequently was charged with one 
count of negligent homicide. 
An initial jury trial ended in a mistrial prior to the 
rendition of a verdict. A second jury trial was held February 
22-26, 1988, and defendant was convicted as charged. 
Defendant's motions to arrest judgment and for a new trial were 
denied. 
ISSUES 
Defendant raises essentially two issues on appeal, arguing 
for a reversal of his conviction. He first claims that the 
State's expert witnesses were not qualified to testify as to the 
applicable medical standard of care. Second, he argues that 
there was insufficient evidence to establish that his conduct 
deviated significantly from the applicable standard of care and 
that there was a causal connection between his conduct and the 
baby's death. 
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
Conduct constituting the crime of negligent homicide occurs 
when an "actor, acting with criminal negligence, causes the 
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death of another.- Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-206(1) (1978). The 
culpable mental state for criminal negligence requires "only 
that a defendant 'ought to be aware of a substantial and 
unjustifiable risk' of death." State v, Standiford. 769 P.2d 
254, 267 (Utah 1988) (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(4) 
(1978)); see also 2 C. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Law § 168 
(14th ed. 1979). Furthermore, "[t]he risk must be of such a 
nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a 
gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary 
person would exercise in all the circumstances as viewed from 
the actor's standpoint." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(4) (1978). 
Consequently, negligent homicide involves a defendant's 
perception of risk and necessarily requires an evaluation of his 
.or her state of mind. State v. Wessendorf. 777 P.2d 523, 525-26 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). Whether a defendant negligently fails to 
perceive the risk is a question of fact for the jury. See State 
v, Howard. 597 P.2d 878, 881 (Utah 1979). However, the risk of 
death "must be of such a degree that an ordinary person would 
not . . . fail to recognize it." State v. Dyer, 671 P.2d 142, 
148 (Utah 1983). 
Because the "failure to perceive the risk constitutes a 
gross deviation from the reasonable man standard," ordinary 
negligence adequate in the civil law is insufficient to 
constitute criminal negligence. State v. Chavez, 605 P.2d 1226, 
1227 (Utah 1979); sea also Standiford, 769 P.2d at 267; 2 C. 
Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Law § 168 (terms such as "criminal 
negligence" are intended to connote deviations from 
reasonableness significantly greater in degree than ordinary 
negligence). Thus, "[m]ere inattention or mistake in judgment 
resulting even in death of another is not criminal unless the 
quality of the act makes it so." People v. Rodriguez, 186 Cal. 
App. 2d 433, 8 Cal. Rptr. 863, 868 (1960). 
EXPERT TESTIMONY 
Defendant contends that expert testimony was required in 
this case to establish the "standard of care," but that the 
State's medical experts were not qualified to testify. On the 
other hand, the State argues that expert medical testimony was 
not required, and that it needed only to present "competent 
evidence to show the nature and degree of risk and the 
circumstances as viewed from the actorfs standpoint." The State 
correctly observes that the "standard of care" in section 
76-2-10°M) refers to the actor's mental state, as opposed to 
medical malpractice cases in which expert medical testimony is 
required to show the applicable standard of medical care. See, 
e.g., Chadwick v. Nielsen. 763 P.2d 817, 821 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988). It is also true that expert testimony is not required to 
prove the mental state of a criminal defendant accused of 
homicide. See State v. Nicholson, 585 P.2d 60, 63 (Utah 1978). 
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We conclude/ however, that expert testimony was required in 
this case since such testimony was necessary to establish the 
nature and degree of risk. Section 76-5-206(1) requires the 
State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant's 
judgment was criminally deficient because he failed to perceive 
a substantial risk that death could occur. Without an 
understanding of the nature and degree of risk, the jury could 
not determine whether the risk was substantial, and if so, 
whether defendant's failure to perceive it was grossly 
negligent. Unless the risk is one within the common knowledge 
and experience of laypersons, it is unlikely that a jury could 
make an informed determination of culpability.2 We believe 
that expert testimony is required where criminal negligence is 
alleged and the nature and degree of risk are beyond the ken of 
the average layperson. See, e.g., Ketchum v. Ward, 422 F. Supp. 
934 (W.D.N.Y. 1976) (State's use of expert medical testimony at 
trial supplied sufficient evidence of criminal negligence for 
negligent homicide conviction in death of mother on whom 
physician had performed legal abortion). 
Defendant argues that the State's expert medical witnesses 
did not qualify as experts because they do not attend home 
deliveries. The witnesses included two obstetrician/ 
gynecologists, a pediatrician, and a neonatologist. Citing the 
medical malpractice case of Burton v. Youncrblood, 711 P.2d 245, 
248 (Utah 1985) (a practitioner of one school of medicine is not 
competent to testify as an expert against the practitioner of 
another school), defendant argues that the State's doctors were 
not qualified to testify because they were of a different school 
of medicine than defendant. 
The qualification of an expert witness is a matter within 
the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Espinoza, 723 
P.2d 420, 421 (Utah 1986). There was evidence in the record 
that there is no board certification or recognized medical 
specialty in home delivery. There was also evidence that the 
medical principles applicable to the delivery of babies are 
applicable whether a birth occurs at home or in a hospital. In 
view of the record evidence, the trial court was within its 
discretion to qualify the State's medical witnesses as experts. 
££. Burton, 711 P.2d at 249 (if methods and procedures of 
general plastic surgeon were shown to be identical to those of 
specialized plastic surgeon, one may testify against the other); 
Wessel v. Erickson Landscaping Co., 711 P.2d 250, 253 (Utah 
1985) (nothing precludes testimony from expert in anther trade 
if the standard is the same for both). "The critical factor in 
2. This is distinct from expert testimony as to~the subjective 
intent of the defendant, i.e., "the actor's viewpoint," which 
need not be accepted by the court and which is ultimately a 
determination for the jury. 
5 
determining the competency of an expert is whether that expert 
has knowledge that can assist the trier of fact in resolving the 
issues before it." I£. at 253; see also Utah R. Evid. 702. We 
conclude that the trial court committed no abuse of discretion 
in allowing the State's experts to testify. 
SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE 
Defendant claims that the evidence presented was 
insufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. To 
convict a person of violating section 76-5-206(1)/ the State 
must establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, both prohibited 
conduct and a culpable mental state. To establish a culpable 
mental state, the prosecution must present evidence that 
defendant was unaware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk of 
death, but should have been so aware. 
We review defendant's claim under a standard that does not 
permit us to substitute our judgment for that of the jury in a 
criminal trial. See State v. Tolman, 775 P.2d 422, 424 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989). Rather, 
we review the evidence and all inferences 
which may reasonably be drawn from it in the 
light most favorable to the verdict of the 
jury. We reverse a jury conviction for 
insufficient evidence only when the 
evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant 
committed the crime of which he was 
convicted. 
State v, Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985) (quoting State v. 
Petree, 659 P.2d-443, 444 (Utah 1983)); SSS. also State v. 
Hopkins. 119 Utah Adv. Rep. 59, 60 (1989). 
Defendant testified at trial that the grandparents weighed 
the newborn baby and determined it to be about five pounds. 
Defendant also said he believed the baby to be two to three 
weeks premature. Defendant was aware that the baby was having 
"grunting respirations," which he said was a sign of early 
respiratory distress syndrome. Defendant positioned the baby in 
such a way that the labored breathing was relieved. He further 
testified that the se\~.ity cr the respiratory distress did not 
indicate a need for hospitalization. He said that he informed 
Ivy that the baby was premature and had difficulty in breathing, 
but that the baby was then stable. He instructed Ivy to call 
him if there was any change and admitted that he was depending 
on Ivy to carefully watch the infant. Before leaving the Young 
residence, defendant noted that the respiratory difficulty had 
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subsided. He stated, "The baby was respiring well, the baby was 
still awake and alert and muscle tone was still good.* He also 
said, 
I was impressed that the baby had already 
shown some signs of respiratory distress 
syndrome, but under similar circumstances in 
the past, I have left babies at home, having 
instructed the mother on how to nurse, 
having instructed the mother to keep the 
baby warm and therefore I felt I could 
leave, confident that grandma would call me, 
confident that if there were any progression 
of symptoms that I would be called. 
Defendant later testified that of 300 home births he had 
attended, approximately ten of those babies had been premature. 
Eight of those had had respiratory distress, but defendant said 
that he had hospitalized only three of those eight. In the case 
of this infant, defendant testified that "in my experience and 
the judgment that I applied at the time based on experience with 
babies who are even smaller than this delivered at home, they 
can in many cases get along very, very well • • . ." 
The State's expert medical witnesses testified that although 
the mother and baby "would do better" in a hospital, defendant's 
evaluation of the infant's well-being would indicate that the 
baby's vital signs were "acceptable." They conceded that the 
infant may have survived had he been hospitalized up to ten 
hours after birth, but believed that leaving the baby at home 
was "bad judgment" on defendant's part.3 
The State's neonatologist testified that hyaline membrane 
disease is a progressive disease. He also indicated that a baby 
in the condition of the deceased is typipally "at high risk for 
medical and surgical problems." As far as mortality for an 
infant with the disease, however, he stated that the failure to 
provide therapy would only place the probability of death at 
five to fifteen percent. He later stated upon cross-examination 
that statistically only two percent of babies die from untreated 
hyaline membrane disease. He further said, "I guess the message 
is it's very unusual and rare to lose a baby at this gestation 
and this birth weight from hyaline membrane disease." 
3. Our research has revealed very few cases in which licensed 
physicians have been charged with negligent homicide. In many 
of those cases where such a charge has been brought, albeit 
under differing statutes, the courts have held that no criminal 
liability attaches when death results from an error of 
judgment. S£S generally Annotation, Homicide Predicated on 
Improper Treatment of Disease or Iniurv, 45 A.L.R.3d 114 (1972). 
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Asked whether it would be outside the medical standard of 
care to have the family of a home-delivered newborn to monitor 
any changes in the baby's condition, the neonatologist believed 
it was, but conceded that other competent physicians would 
disagree with him. This response merely reinforces our 
conclusion that his testimony, as well as that of the other 
experts for the State, must be construed in light of the fact 
that home delivery, though legal, is not a widespread practice 
by doctors in Utah, The State's experts testified that the 
medical community in this state does not teach or train 
physicians for home delivery and generally recommends against it. 
We are convinced that even looking at the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the verdict, that evidence was 
"sufficiently inconclusive" to establish that there was a 
substantial and unjustifiable risk of death such that defendant 
should have been aware of it. Thus, reasonable minds could 
examine the evidence presented and entertain "a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant committed the crime of which he was 
convicted." Sfi£ Booker. 709 P.2d at 345. 
Since we conclude that the evidence failed to establish 
criminal negligence, we need not reach the issue whether 
defendant's acts or omissions were the legal cause of death. 
Defendant's conviction is reversed. 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
I CONCUR: 
OJjrt..l.§..IOr>J_ 
Z4 Robert Bullock, Judge 
GREENWOOD, Judge: (concurring and dissenting) 
I concur in Judge Bench's opinion concerning expert 
testimony, but dissent from the opinion's conclusion that there 
was not sufficient evidence to su*/«din the jury's con/iction of 
negligent homicide. The majority opinion correctly states the 
necessary quantum of evidence for negligent homicide as being 
where the defendant should have been aware of a substantial and 
unjustified risk of death, but was not. State v. Wessendorf, 
777 P.2d 523, 525 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Also, the risk must be 
such that an ordinary person would not disregard or fail to 
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recognize it. State v. Dver. 671 P.2d 142, 148 (Utah 1983). 
Therefore, in this case, the State was required to convince the 
jury that there was a substantial and unjustified risk that the 
infant would die if he did not receive medical care in a 
hospital-type setting; that defendant was unaware that the risk 
existed; and that an ordinary person in defendant's position 
would have recognized that risk. Our task as an appellate 
court, is to determine if the evidence presented, when viewed 
favorably to the jury verdict, "is sufficiently inconclusive or 
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the 
crime of which he was convicted." State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 
342, 345 (Utah 1985) (quoting State v. Petree. 659 P.2d 443, 444 
(1983)). 
My assessment of the evidence supporting the jury verdict is 
as follows: defendant was a licensed physician who had 
maintained a family practice since 1968, including obstetrical 
care; defendant assumed responsibility for the infant's physical 
well-being by agreeing to deliver it at home; defendant did not 
insist on examining the mother when she reported vaginal 
bleeding to determine if premature birth was likely or if so, 
what precautions should be taken to minimize the likelihood of 
premature birth; defendant diagnosed the infant after birth as 
having Respiratory Distress Syndrome; defendant advised Ivy to 
position the infant in a way which relieved the symptoms but 
would not alleviate the condition itself; defendant minimized 
the seriousness of the infant's condition to Ivy and Joanne; 
three of the ten children he had delivered who had Respiratory 
Distress Syndrome were hospitalized; defendant knew the infant 
could die from the disease and that the disease was progressive; 
defendant could not himself admit the .infant into a hospital 
because he lacked malpractice insurance, so would have to call 
another physician or have the infant admitted through an 
emergency room facility; Ivy testified that defendant only told 
her to watch the infant for changes in his temperature, color 
and respiration, without advising her as to the degree of change 
which might indicate a crisis, nor did he warn her or Joanne 
that death could result from the disease; and defendant left the 
infant in the care of laypersons. 
There was other, conflicting evidence which would indicate 
that defendant should not have been aware that a substantial 
risk existed. However, the existence of conflicting evidence, 
by itself, does not justify reversal of a jury verdict. State 
v. Tolman, 775 P.2d 422, 424-25 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). The jury 
has been through the arduous task of listening to and assessing 
the evidence presented in this most difficult case, and I do not 
think that we should appropriately substitute our judgment for 
that of the jury. The jury's conclusion was based on what 
defendant knew or the jury believed he knew at the time, and its 
assessment that given that knowledge he should have known the 
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risks. I do not find the evidence "sufficiently inconclusive/" 
as do my colleagues, to justify conviction. I would conclude 
that the record/ while heatedly controverted/ contains 
sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that defendant 
should have been aware that a substantial and unjustified risk 
of death existed/ and to convict defendant of negligent homicide 
as a rasult. 
t&mt^^r / ' 
Pamela T. Greenwood/ Judge 
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Second-Circuit Court, Layton Department No. 871000415 
D. Utah Code Ann. §76-2-103(4) (1974) 
76-2-103. Definitions of Mintentionally, or with intent 
or willfully"; "knowingly, or with knowledge"; 
"recklessly, or maliciously"; and "criminal 
negligence or criminally negligent." 
A person engages in conduct: 
• * * 
(4) With criminal negligence or is criminally 
negligent with respect to circumstances 
surrounding his conduct or the result of his 
conduct when he ought to be aware of a substantial 
and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances 
exist or the result will occur• The risk must be 
of such a nature and degree that the failure to 
perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the 
standard of care that an ordinary person would 
exercise in all the circumstances as viewed from 
the actor's standpoint. 
36 
E. Utah Code Ann. §76-5-206 (1973) 
76-5-206. Negligent homicide. 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes negligent 
homicide if the actor, acting with criminal 
negligence, causes the death of another. 
(2) Negligent homicide is a class A 
misdemeanor. 
37 
F. Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2 et seq. (1953, as amended) 
78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction. 
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of 
state law certified by a court of the United States. 
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary 
writs and authority to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect 
its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals; 
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior 
to final judgment by the Court of Appeals; 
(c) discipline of lawyers; 
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission; 
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originat-
ing with: 
(i) the Public Service Commission; 
(ii) the State Tax Commission; 
(iii) the Board of State Lands and Forestry; 
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; or 
(v) the state engineer; 
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review of informal adju-
dicative proceedings of agencies under Subsection (e); 
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of 
the United States or this state unconstitutional on its face under the 
Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution; 
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of 
a first degree or capital felony; 
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction of a first de-
gree or capital felony; and 
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the 
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the. 
matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, 
except: 
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a 
court of record involving a charge of a capital felony; 
(b) election and voting contests; 
(c) reapportionment of election districts; 
(d) retention or removal of public officers; 
(e) general water adjudication; 
(f) taxation and revenue; and 
(g) those matters described in Subsection (3)(a) through (f). 
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition 
for writ of certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the 
Supreme Court shall review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals 
under Subsection (3)(b). 
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Chapter 46b, 
Title 63, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
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